On (Not) Losing Our (Civil) Religion

On April 3, 1890, in Lehi, Utah, my maternal great-great-grandmother, Martha Mercer Kirkham, joined with other women to form a local chapter of the Woman Suffrage Association of Utah, an affiliate of the National Women’s Suffrage Association. Women in Utah had been granted the right to vote in local and territorial elections in 1870, but the Edmunds-Tucker Act, passed by Congress and signed by President Cleveland in 1877, disenfranchised Utah women as part of the national government’s effort to crush the Mormon defense of plural marriage. Kirkham wasn’t a plural wife, but she was a voter, and was deeply frustrated at this right being taken away from her. A humble 19th-century Utah woman, she stood and was recorded as saying:

Mrs. President, Ladies and Friends: 

In my weak way will try to address you a few moments. I believe we are in a good cause. We have our rights but have had one great right taken from us. I, for one, felt bad when my vote was taken away. I only had the privilege of voting a few times. If we live as we should do we would vote the same as our husbands, and he, being the head, should know how to lead, which I believe is his place, and woman to follow. I have always believed that if that good feeling that should be between man and wife existed they should be able to walk along together and be one in council with their family, and also in business; otherwise there is confusion. But the woman should not be looked upon as below the intelligence of man. She has the need of it and should try to keep herself posted with the spirit of the times for her benefit and also for the good of her family. How can she impart what she does not know herself? We have need of all we can learn, for how great is the mission of woman, and why should she not be able to have a voice to make law, to govern her sons and daughters? I, for one, would be pleased to have my vote again; it looks rather gloomy now, but no excellence without labor.

Kirkham never did get her vote back; she died at 37 years old in November that same year, and Utah women didn't get the opportunity to vote once again until Utah was admitted as a state in 1896. And of course, I strongly suspect that no one reading this (unless one of those readers are Secretary of Defense War Pete Hegseth and his sometimes-spiritual advisor, the anti-feminist and Mormon-suspicious Christian nationalist, Doug Wilson) would be fully comfortable embracing Kirkham's acceptance of patriarchy and headship when it comes to family roles. Still, her insistence that she was not "below the intelligence" of her husband--and, by implication, any other person--and thus should enjoy the same legal rights as he is, I think, the deepest, truest aspect of America's whole experiment with self-government, its whole civil religion, that one can imagine. The fact that hundreds of millions--and not just American citizens--have been inspired by this particular principle ought to be evidence enough of that, unless you're one of those reactionary or postliberal conservatives who thinks the very idea of popular sovereignty is an unfortunate canard.

I’ve associated America’s civil religion with the extension of basic democratic rights—most centrally the right to the vote, and thus the right to participate formally in the kind of collective self-governance which the United States, when understood in light of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, is founded upon—many, many, many times. I recognize the theoretical complications with doing so. What I’m doing is trying to connect what some would call “sentimental,” or “bland,” or even “anemic” liberal practices (and voting can certainly seem like all of the above, sometimes) with something tied up with deeply communitarian or cultural or even spiritual understandings of identity and belonging. Much of the scholarly writing on these topics tends to focus on “nationalism” or “patriotism,” and pose the question as to whether or not such feelings can ever be purely “civic,” or whether there needs to be (or inevitably, however unknowingly, must be) some kind of historical or ethnic or religious or linguistic or racial character to those senses of identity and belonging. Those in the latter camp (Vice President J.D. Vance quite obviously is, or at least wants to present himself as such) look upon the articulation of a civil religion or a sense of American identity that involves mostly just individuals exercising democratic freedoms and choices as nonsense.

My response to that—the response that makes me want to both keep those liberal freedoms and expand them and reclaim them when taken away, as my great-great-grandmother did—is to say that Vance, et al, have an exceptionally narrow understanding of how social ties and senses of belonging are formed in the first place. It is, I would argue, an unavoidable facet of human nature to want to understand the actions of individuals (including oneself) as embedded in some sort of collective, morally (and often religiously) substantive—that is, “truthful”—cultural order. This is the fundamentally dialogic character as human beings coming out: our ability to speak, think, associate, and judge impels us to retrieve from or construct through our social lives an arrangement of meaning. The result, as numerous religious historians have pointed out, is that the arguably “unsubstantive” civic actions that we take—like voting—themselves develop over time (through rituals and practices and terminology and traditions and more) into what might be called "voluntary national religious establishments." Not in the sense of an established church, but in the sense that there are forms of life and routines of expression that we come to rely upon, that we come to view as ordinary, or normal. And yes, as such norms develop and put down their roots, the question of defending them (as well as regularly critiquing them) becomes a part of the equation.

The paranoia some feel about how the changes which extending the notion of equality into ever more arenas and ever more aspects of life (from property and religion to race and gender, from voting and military service to marriage and participation in high school sports) may threaten those norms is not unreasonable. But what is unreasonable is the claim that the push and pull over our norms and social constructions, over the bonds and beliefs which constitute our civil and religious order(s), is itself somehow beside the point, and that really all that matters is some kind of sovereign declaration of identity. (Which necessitates a nation-state with a unified executive capable of issuing such declarations, perhaps.) Robert Putnam, the scholar who developed the idea of social capital, essentially concluded that the difficulties people like Vance highlight are short-term ones, ones that—in particular in immigrant societies like the U.S.—is always being negotiated by the emergence of “cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities.” That is substantive stuff—that’s what makes for strong citizens, and thus strong families and strong neighborhoods. (As my great-great-grandmother Kirkham put it, “how great is the mission of woman, and why should she not be able to have a voice to make law, to govern her sons and daughters?”)

As a matter of theory and history, the complications in making these connections are many. Saying that America’s Jeffersonian creed, the affirmation that “all men are created equal,” and that therefore—especially once the U.S. Constitution was forced, following the Civil War, to bring the principles of the Declaration into its fundamental law—the affirmation that American citizens by right enjoy the ability to vote and act and build lives unconstrained by some natural hierarchy, itself constitutes our civil religion, our “voluntary establishment,” in an entirely substantive and not merely “civic” way, is to claim a lot. Some would argue that it claims too much, and that it would be much better to seek to articulate a liberal vision of equality and democratic participation and anti-hierarchy without messing around with claims which necessarily require a faith in an establishing “people” who are substantively articulating themselves in the first place. I find those arguments fascinating. But I’m enough of a liberal republican, a believer in both individual democratic rights and in the places and communities—the many diverse publica of the American nation—wherein we collective exercise them, to trust that, whatever else was wrong with the Founders original understanding of this American experiment, these principles, the principles that my great-great-grandmother humbly hoped to be able to exercise again before she died, are ones that this country can still run with, can still both defend and critique, can still build upon.

I don’t think America has lost its civil religion yet. I still believe in the power of ordinary people to organize (as those women in the Lehi chapter of the Woman Suffrage Association of Utah were), to express themselves (as Martha Mercer Kirkham stood up to do), and to vote, thus placing themselves, as citizens, on the same level as everyone and anyone else. Understanding the challenge posed by those who threaten that which binds these practices, these perspectives, this power, together with their own personal demagogic declarations, whether as performers of anti-democratic epic theory or just plain old-fashioned bread and circuses, is probably the first step to making sure we won’t. 

 

 

Getting Direct About the Politics Behind Kansas’s August Amendment

Walking around my Wichita neighborhood over the past couple of weeks, I’ve noticed something about the yard signs encouraging people to “Vote No” on the constitutional amendment to allow for the popular election of Kansas Supreme Court justices come August 4. (Until just the past three days, I hadn’t seen with my own eyes any “Vote Yes” yard signs, but I have now seen a couple.) These yard signs are, in their color, font, and design, basically identical to many of the “Vote No” yard signs I saw around my neighborhood four years ago, when the vote to change the language of the Kansas state constitution so as to eliminate any judicial support for abortion rights was decisively defeated. Just look and see:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Relatedly, over the past few weeks my home has received about a half-dozen mailers encouraging a no vote this August. (We’ve received exactly one “yes” flyer thus far.) Two of those mailers were particularly emphatic, insisting that this vote is about keeping the Kansas Supreme Court “fair and impartial” and preventing “billionaire political donors” from influencing the justices by paying for the political campaigns judicial candidate would have to run to win a spot on the Court. I’ve no doubt about the sincerity of those who created these messages, and the arguments they’re making are entirely valid. But the fact that both were mailed by Planned Parenthood Great Plains, an organization dedicated to preserving abortion rights in Kansas, is worth noting nonetheless.

My point is simple. On the surface, the constitutional referendum Kansans will vote on this August 4 is simply a question about changing one of the elements of our state’s constitutional structure, a merit-based structure that emerged over 80 years ago, was first adopted in Missouri—Kansas adopted it about in 1958—and was quickly adopted by many other states concerned about corruption in partisan election judicial-selection systems that were then common (though in recent decades has been rejected by voters in multiple states seeking greater democratic accountability from their justices as well). But substantively, this constitutional referendum is actually a vote about possible policy outcomes—and while that’s usually not being said by those most engaged in the campaign both for and against the referendum, I suspect that pretty much everyone paying attention already knows it.

Earlier this month, Amii Castle, a law professor at the University of Kansas, said this quiet part out loud, using the very words of some of the strongest Republican backers of the amendment—Kansas Attorney General Kris Kobach, and Kansas Senate President Ty Masterson—to show that this proposed amendment is rooted explicitly in the failure of the 2022 anti-abortion amendment, and the desire to get different judges on the Supreme Court so as to get different rulings regarding abortion rights in Kansas. Knowing that, why shouldn’t those who want to defend those rights campaign on the same terms as well?

Castle, though, received some push-back on social media and elsewhere for being so explicit, with some of those opposed to the amendment insisting that constitutional principles of judicial neutrality supposedly protected through Kansas’s current, somewhat complicated system of choosing Supreme Court justices (nomination by a judicial commission, appointment by governor, and retention elections at the conclusion of a judge’s term) are the paramount concern.

As someone who teaches the arguments over those constitutional principles, I respect the claims of those—including some former members of the Kansas Supreme Court itself—who believe that Kansas’s procedure for choosing justices is worth preserving simply on its own terms. But as someone who is also theoretically suspicious of most efforts to keep the messiness of electoral politics out of the judicial side of our government, I find myself rather more appreciative of those who choose instead to present the possible policy consequences of electing the members of the Supreme Court more directly

Does this mean that I don’t respect Kansas’s system for choosing Supreme Court justices? Not at all—I can see the civic virtues of the prioritization of professionalism and at least nominal nonpartisanship in our selection process. But I can also see its democratic flaws. For example, the fact that despite numerous contentious decisions over the nearly 70 years during which this system has been in place in our state, not a single Kansas state Supreme Court justice has ever lost their retention election, provides—at least to my mind—just as much evidence of the limitations of the democratic checks upon our appointed state justices as do Kansas’s gerrymandered congressional districts when it comes to questions of democratic representation.

Many might challenge me right here—in what sense should “democratic checks” or “democratic representation” be at all relevant to the judicial branch in the state of Kansas, or anywhere else? Isn’t the judicial branch supposed to be counter-majoritarian, a set of referees and umpires who are not playing the political games of democracy, but who rather are simply imposing the apolitical rules and processes of the majesty of the law?

Responding to that challenge would require me to get into the “theoretical suspicions” I referenced above. Specifically, my two-fold suspicions that 1) the emergence of the idea of an independent judiciary actually does not match the historical struggle toward creating a system wherein the democratic sovereignty of the people was both recognized as legitimate and hopefully made somewhat compatible with good government (it is worth noting that, originally, judicial elections were seen as a way of ensuring judicial independence, by allowing “the people,” rather than legislative, professional, or political elites, to choose who will administer the courts); and 2) that the actual practices of preserving judicial independence from the messy political reality of a people working through their governing structure so as to exercise that sovereignty don’t actually accomplish what people—many of them judges—think they do. (As one scholar put it pithily over 25 years ago, stating calmly what millions who have watched the Roberts court rule on voting rights, presidential immunity, and more over the past 15 years, "The assumption that independent judges use their freedom to decide impartially according to the law is contradicted by the empirical evidence.")

But rather than hauling out my legislative supremacist bona fides and rehearsing my radical small-d democratic recriminations about judicial review and unelected and unaccountable judges, etc., etc., let me take the more reasonable route. If I might have at one time taken a more burn-it-all-down position, age—and the lessons of Donald Trump’s presidency—have made me more sympathetic to finding ways to preserve the accomplishments of bourgeois constitutionalism, even as we need to focus radical critiques more directly to where changes to its legal and socio-economic structures are most needed. In the meantime, I agree that it’s important that we retain at least some belief in the supposedly non-partisan, supposedly apolitical character of the judiciary—what another scholar called the “secular religion of constitutionalism,” the faith that the “rule of law” will continue to work so long as we “believe it works.” The complicated, practical question is, to quote one more legal theorist, “when (if ever) does the cost of enabling judges to act upon their political preferences or attitudes by insulating them from democratic accountability exceed the benefits of protecting them from threats to their tenure that compromise their capacity to adhere to the rule of law?”

Viewed this way, the proposed amendment to be voted on in Kansas this August really comes down to a specific accounting of likely political costs. For me, that means that Kansas’s merit-based system for selecting judges has, simply for a variety of unpredictable historical, political, and sociological reasons—the occasional tendency of Kansans, as an unconscious counter to the overwhelming Republican majorities elected to the state legislature, to elect Democrats to the judicial-appointment-making governorship? the concentration of Kansas lawyers (and thus possible members of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission, or for that matter actual possible Supreme Court candidates) in a handful of more urban, actually growing Kansas counties? something else?—worked pretty well, insofar as protecting basic liberal rights are concerned. Hence, my appreciation of those who look at the campaign over this proposed amendment, like the makers of the yard signs I mentioned above, and see it in terms of the substantive political possibilities inseparable from it.

When defenders of the current system make it a matter of high principle—judicial impartiality!—I can’t help but want to dive into the relevant theoretical and historical arguments, and ask for evidence why I should believe that the highest court in our state judiciary somehow would be fundamentally broken by obliging it to operate like the state supreme courts of more of more than 20 other states. But if you just make it all about the politics which arguably are unavoidably interwoven into any judicial decision anyway? Then my vote—especially since the language of the amendment gives no guarantee that any hypothetical election system that our Republican legislature may set up would be non-partisan or based on particular districts, both of which are in my opinion good balancing tools when it comes to electing judges—is clear. And my bet is that, remembering 2022, the votes of most other Kansas will be the same.

Rauch Among the Mormons

[Cross-posted to By Common Consent]

Jonathan Rauch’s Cross Purposes: Christianity's Broken Bargain with Democracy, the latest book by the longtime policy journalist and public thinker, argues three things:

--first, that throughout American history Christian churches have played an essential role in enabling our liberal democracy to properly function;

--second, that America’s Christian churches (mostly, though not exclusively, Protestant ones) have of late abandoned this role, and by so doing have contributed to the breakdown of liberal and democratic rules and norms in American life;

--and third, that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has continued to model exactly the sort of role which historically American Christian churches had once played, and that therefore, the more the rest of American Christianity can learn from and perhaps even emulate the Mormons–very specifically, the room which he believes LDS doctrines and practices make for a pluralistic civic theology–the healthier America’s democratic culture and institutions will be. 

Given the praise contained in that third point–and given the philosophically liberal presumptions which underlie it–it’s not surprising that Rauch and his book have received a positive, bordering on enthusiastic, reception among intellectually-inclined mainstream American Mormons, while a small philosophically (as opposed to merely politically) conservative minority have viewed Rauch’s arguments far more suspiciously. Who is right? Assessing that requires considering Rauch’s claims in somewhat more detail.

Rauch is well-known as an advocate of classical liberalism and political moderation; indeed, a large part of his reputation as a writer has been built on the fact that he is both an unapologetic atheist and a gay activist, yet neither reasons nor votes the way most Americans would stereotypically assume a gay atheist would. Throughout his career, Rauch has presented himself as a consummate pragmatist, always asking careful questions and eschewing any kind of controlling ideology. Of course, as with pragmatism generally, this kind of evidence-based, practical-minded worldview does tend to support a particular ideological position–namely, a classically liberal, utilitarian, and secular one, in the spirit of John Locke, Adam Smith, James Madison, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. Early in Cross Purposes, he describes his ideological preferences (though without calling them that) succinctly: “the modern tradition of freedom, toleration, minority rights, and the rule of law.” In support of such aims, he sees “three linked social systems” as essential: “liberal democracy to make political choices; market capitalism to make economic choices; and science and other forms of open critical exchange to make epistemic choices” (p. 12). He is and long has been a consistent defender of responsible, thoughtful, but nonetheless total individual choice, in matters of politics and economics and religion, unfettered by custom or community.

Still, he's no libertarian. He knows that there are things that he does not and perhaps cannot know, and thus needs reign in his drive for individual autonomy and trust at least to a certain degree in the slow, patient work of ideas and options through society and culture. It is that conservatism in his nature which has led him, a non-believer, to take seriously the historical role that Christianity has played in the development of the American democratic system that he prizes. In the book, he repents of his one-time intellectual over-reliance upon the separation of church and state when addressing social and political problems; he now views his youthful celebration of “apatheism”–the ideal of simply “not caring very much one way or another about religion”–as “superficial” (p. 5). Instead, he now believes “not just that secular liberalism and religious faith are instrumentally interdependent but that each is intrinsically reliant on the other to build a morally and epistemically complete and coherent account of the world” (p. 21).

In his view, since secularism and freedom of choice cannot fulfill the human need for belonging and meaning, and since the Christian religion cannot escape its inability to account for the physical laws and the moral horrors of the universe, what is necessary–and what he believes that “the United States has been generally good” at for most of its existence–is for both American Christianity and liberal democracy to do their part in holding up the walls of our civic home. Creating an environment wherein this balance can be maintained requires “that the Constitution be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the well-being of law-abiding faith communities, and that God’s work be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the well-being of democratic pluralism” (p. 33). The rule of liberalism in matters of politics and law must always accommodate religious exceptions, he affirms–but at the same time, the rule of Christian faith in society and culture must always give way to liberal protections and rights. This is a complicated balance, but it is one Rauch has confidence in, and one that he seeks to persuade his secular readers to be confident in as well.

Having laid his foundation, Rauch proceeds to build an argument that aligns with a good deal of other contemporary sociological research and political observation. First, that over the 20th century, mainline Protestant churches became less culturally distinct, losing their ability to mold their parishioners and implicitly direct them towards the virtuous role they had historically played in America’s civic order. And second, that Protestant churches which rejected the mainline’s compromise with secular liberalism gradually moved in an ever more partisan direction, adopting a paranoid and conspiratorial version of Christian teachings which Rauch refers to as “the Church of Fear.” This transformation led them to acquiesce to–and eventually triumphantly embrace–the vulgarity, immorality, and cruelty of Donald Trump’s paranoia and defensiveness as their perfect political avatar. And while I will not deny that my personal political judgments are a factor here, I would still insist that the passages where Rauch brings receipts, showing how thoroughly un-Christian it is to support Trump and the party he has built in his image, are really the best in the whole book. 

Rauch shows how evangelical (again, primarily Protestant) Christians have dismissed their previous insistence upon personal character in judging candidates, and in so doing ignored Trump’s criminality; how their gleeful identification with Trump as a cultural fighter has underscored how little faith they actually have in God’s providence; and how their embrace of what Rauch calls “sharp Christianity” has prevented them from articulating even a semblance of adherence to the Christian imperative to forgive and love, rather than fight and punish. It is, frankly, a damning indictment–and since he believes that those imperatives have been central to the develop of the civic culture within which American democracy developed, it is an indictment of Trump’s Christian supporters as un-American as well. All of which leads him to conclude:

[S]ecular liberalism and Christianity have separate purposes. They do not need to ally (and should not); but they do need to align, at least well enough so that democracy’s wheels don’t come off. . . . In that respect, we seculars are entitled to hold the church accountable to the democracy of which it is part. We are entitled to hold it accountable for the choices it makes. While the church’s relationship with God is its own business, secular Americans are justified in reminding our Christian friends that the Church of Fear is toxic for them and for us. We are not out of our lane to suggest that what Russell Moore calls 'confident Christianity'–one which 'constantly reminds us that this life is less important than the next [and] demonstrates something of what it means to forgive and serve one another'–needs repair for all our sakes. In short, we have standing to hope, perhaps even insist, that Christians get their act together (p. 89).

As I wrote at the beginning, Rauch believes American Mormonism provides a model of action that Christians could use a blueprint to repair themselves. But should we accept as accurate his overarching historical account of American civic pluralism? Should we accept as correct what he sees within the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as contributing to it? And if we do not accept one or both of these, does that mean the conservative critique of Rauch is correct? 

Let’s begin with what I assume to be the most obvious problem (at least for the likely readership of this essay; were I a Roman Catholic, Rauch’s Protestant-centric account of America’s civic culture would probably rankle even more). Any Mormon who is remotely familiar with our own history ought to be prompted to ask Rauch why his initial description of the American bargain between Christianity and democracy doesn't incorporate an explanation for the profoundly anti-pluralist attacks on Mormonism that defined its nineteenth-century development. After all, perhaps the single greatest argument that America’s liberal democracy was not, in fact, built within the liberal civic walls he describes was the official exclusion and persecution that violently drove the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints out of the United States entirely. And this is not a parochial point; placing nineteenth-century anti-Mormonism alongside slavery and Know-Nothingism as clear signs that America’s Protestant Christian civic culture was heavily dependent upon racial, ethnic, religious, and gender exclusion is broadly accepted as a key component of any historically honest consideration of America’s civic identity.

Yet the only discussion of this defining example of religious oppression in American history which is present in Cross Purposes isn’t to be found Rauch’s description of the intellectual components of America’s liberal democratic culture, as it should be; rather, it appears as one of the motivating reasons why Mormons–on Rauch’s reading–are so supportive of that democratic culture: “the modern church’s...memory of persecution has bred sensitivity to the importance of religious freedom and pluralism” (p. 108). Contrary examples from Mormon history–like Brigham Young’s politically illiberal State of Deseret or the economically illiberal United Order of Enoch–receive no mention in the book. Joseph Smith’s Council of Fifty does get a mention, but even that rhetorical embrace of religious authoritarianism–however quickly abandoned–is instead presented entirely in terms a defense of freedom and religious choice, emphasizing how “Smith went so far as to...propose constitutional revisions requiring ‘the armies of the government’ to enforce ‘principles of liberty’ for all people, not just the Protestant majority” (p. 110). That Rauch passes over the complications of Smith’s not-always-coherent embrace of both religious authoritarianism and republican freedom, to say nothing of other explorations of very real authoritarian alternatives present throughout American history is, perhaps, predictable, but still unfortunate.

My point here is not to claim that LDS church members (like myself), or Americans generally, necessarily must have some secret, ambiguous authoritarianism historically buried in our belief system. (Not that the rise of Trump hasn’t led some historians of American religion to suggest exactly that.) Rather, it is to claim that Rauch’s understanding of America’s liberal democracy and its relationship to expressions of religious faith, both as a matter of history and a matter of theory, is simplistic, and it requires papering over many ideas and actions that cannot be neatly arranged into a straightforward argument against the terrible choices which Christian churches that have embraced Donald Trump’s person and agenda have made, however worthwhile such an argument may be. 

Rauch makes a good deal of the LDS doctrine of agency, and connects that doctrine (one which, under Rauch’s reading, stipulates that, as all of God’s children have the ability to make choices, the process of choice–if not necessarily the end result–must be respected and tolerated and negotiated with) to several passages in sermons and speeches of President Dallin H. Oaks: “Oaks argues for an alignment between God’s moral constitution and Madison’s political one. Speaking for the church, he sees patience, negotiation, and compromise...as social and spiritual ends unto themselves” (p. 96). Rauch’s discussion of Oaks’s ideas is thoughtful, and his connection of them to larger LDS perspectives on matters dear to Rauch’s heart (he describes the surprise passage of the “Utah Compromise” in 2015, which provided protection against housing and employment discrimination to Utah’s LGBTQ population, as “inspirational”–p. 100) is obviously sincere. But it is difficult to square his praise of Utah Governor Spencer Cox for apologizing to LGBTQ Utahns for his past offenses in 2016, with his silence regarding Cox’s vocal support for Donald Trump and opposition to the interests of trans individuals in 2024, or his quotation of polls from 2016 and 2020, showing comparatively low levels of support for Trump among LDS Republicans, while failing to note more recent polls which show that support for Trump increased among all Mormon demographics in 2024. To be sure, these snapshots are part of a complicated story. But a complicated story about LDS history and culture–one where our appreciation of personal agency and public spiritedness is deeply entwined with our own particular, prophet-idolizing Church of Fear–is not what Rauch wanted to tell. 

In some ways the critique of Rauch made by conservative–or “post-liberal”–Mormons is thus correct here. Ralph Hancock’s pointed challenge--“how can religion ‘align’ itself with liberalism...without at some level in or some way ‘supporting’ Rauch’s liberal (that is, atheistic and ‘scientific’) understanding of truth and of humanity?”–is a hard one for those desirous to accept Rauch’s conflation of being a good Mormon and being a good (that is, non-Trumpist) modern American to deal with, and his fierce dismissal of Rauch’s key theological claim about Mormonism–“his understanding of ‘agency’ is neither a remotely adequate phenomenology of human choice nor a serious rendering of LDS belief”–is undeniably true. Unfortunately, Hancock’s conservative rebuke of Rauch’s longed (and simplistic) for rapprochement between liberal principles and Christian churches in America is also, in it’s own way, superficial. Rauch’s summation of the message of Christianity as “Don’t be afraid. Imitate Jesus. Forgive each other,” is obviously incomplete, and designed to point out an easy alignment between Jesus and his hero James Madison. But it is a substantive message, nonetheless, one grounded in a deep conviction of and commitment to Jesus’s loving, sacrificial gift of grace. To claim, as Hancock does, that the characteristics of Christianity which Rauch correctly condemns many Christian churches for having abandoned in their partisan, paranoid embrace of Donald Trump--namely humility, forgiveness, and tolerance--are somehow actually insufficient to allow for a “substantial participation as Christians in public life” is pure nonsense (or at least, nonsensical assuming one accepts such giants of liberal Christianity from Dorothy Day to William Sloane Coffin to Fred Rogers to Eugene England as Christians, which I assume Hancock would, though perhaps only with large, grudging asterisks beside their names).

To be fair to Hancock, none of those Christian leaders had to explicitly confront what he considers to the primary challenge to maintaining a substantive Christian anthropology today: namely, gay marriage and other assorted LGBTQ issues. Rauch himself frequently underscores how difficult these concerns–or indeed, his own marriage to his gay partner–are for certain Christian believers, which is again what brings him back to the LDS church, and how he believes its chastening failure in the fight against same-sex marriage made it re-dedicate itself to its supposed inner liberalism: “After its Proposition 8 debacle in 2008, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has foregrounded those elements of its faith which harmonize with America’s constitutional order” (p.120). Rauch believes, in short, that even Mormonism’s illiberal elements (which he does not theologically explore) point in the direction of a Christianity at peace with pluralism and negotiation. The LDS church changed regarding plural marriage and the priesthood ban on Blacks, after all, and yet it remains a substantive, in no sense “thin” church. So why shouldn’t the rest of Christianity follow its example, and make its way through a culture supportive of gay rights respectfully too? And it is this prospect which most horrifies conservative critics of Rauch’s vision of Mormonism–in Hancock’s words, the fear that “LDS church members have been insufficiently appreciative of the positive cultural and evangelical effects of the church’s alliance with Roman Catholics and others” in opposing gay marriage; the fear that the institutional church, in its drive to “participate in the fashioning of legislative compromises” over LGBTQ issues, will not fully attend to the “trade-offs of these compromises and their long-term effects”; and the fear that Mormons will take a little too seriously the idea of “peacemaking,” which comes “perilously close to endorsing not only the fundamental dignity of all God’s children, but even the ideological self-understanding of those with whom we find that we must compromise.” These are the sorts of terrors that will keep those who find the substance of their Christian faith mostly fully defined by few passages from Paul’s Letter to the Romans and a few pages from Spencer W. Kimball’s The Miracle of Forgiveness awake at night, that’s for certain.

Surprisingly to me, I find myself thinking that President Oaks’s words provide a better guide to the complexities of maintaining a binding Christian faith in the midst of a world of individual choice, as well as a better guide to the doctrinal imperatives behind such supposedly banal principles as showing respect to and non-violent acceptance of those whom one disagrees with, than do either Rauch or his critics. Rauch celebrates Oaks’s comments from the University of Virginia in 2021, “Going Forward with Religious Freedom and Non-Discrimination,” but that speech leaves aside explicit consideration of LGBTQ issues, mentioning them only in passing, preferring to avoid any explicit reference to doctrines or ideas, and instead endorsing the view of a colleague that practical, informal, non-rule-based trade-offs often work well in addressing questions about compromise where “abstract principles sometimes cannot.” Hancock describes Oaks’s General Conference sermon “Balancing Truth and Tolerance” as a “classic address,” highlighting its martial language “We are cast as combatants in the war between truth and error. There is no middle ground.” However, he seems to fail to fully appreciate the sermon’s very next sentence: “We must stand up for truth, even while we practice tolerance and respect for beliefs and ideas different from our own and for the people who hold them” (italics added). The post-liberal rejection of Rauch’s version of Mormonism appears to insist upon a supposed distinction between respect and tolerance, between people and the beliefs they hold--Hancock in fact goes so far as to state that it simply isn’t possible for religious believers to function honestly in an environment of democratic compromise while holding to a doctrinal understanding that their opponents are “profoundly and disastrously wrong.” Yet that admittedly hard, deeply Christian thing is pretty much exactly what Oaks is calling the Mormon faithful to do. 

Rauch is too much of a secular liberal, too committed to open inquiry, to automatically assume that any one view is “profoundly and disastrously wrong.” In contrast to the paranoia of the post-liberals, Rauch’s view of Christianity–even that Christianity which he believes has been horribly twisted into an advocacy for authoritarianism–is neither dismissive nor domineering; on the contrary, he holds up the minority position, what he calls the “exilic mindset,” as something profoundly honorable (p. 135). Like Oaks, Rauch understands the virtue of those see the world in accordance with a different truth than he. (In his General Conference address, Oaks insisted that, even when believing Mormons enjoy a majority position in a community, “they should always be sensitive to the views of the minority,” something that those members of the LDS church who have become convinced that they, and their conservative Christian allies, stand alone, defending Western Civilization, against the woke and LGBTQ hordes, perhaps ought to be reminded of.) So while Rauch’s articulation of that virtue is far from philosophically complete, he has nonetheless perceived something about kindness and respect, compromise and forgiveness, something that too many Christians in America have forgotten. If this gay atheist has found a way to use Mormonism–or at least one small, perhaps insufficiently developed part of it–to call those Christians (including some members of our own tribe) back to those principles, we owe him our thanks, and ought to listen to him as well.

Could President Trump Take Over Policing in Wyandotte County? (A Brief Primer on Presidential Power at our Current Moment)

[An expanded version of my Insight Kansas column, which appeared in Kansas newspapers this weekend.]

Three weeks ago, President Trump declared that "the District of Columbia has lost control of public order and safety," and ordered armed troops into the streets of Washington DC to fight crime. His additional comments--that the nation’s capital is filled with "violent gangs and bloodthirsty criminals, roving mobs of wild youth, drugged-out maniacs, and homeless people"—were all basically>untrue; while there are plenty of disputesover how to measure DC’s violent crime rates and how to interpret the data we do have, it seems clear that Washington DC is actually experiencing lower crime rates than it has in decades. But my primary interest here is more local than that. 

At the time Trump spoke, the FBI listed the District of Columbia as the 29^th most violent city in the U.S., with an average of 926 violent crimes per each 100,000 residents. That’s above the national average—but also well below Kansas City, KS, which the FBI ranked 21^st, with an average of 1047 violent crimes per 100,000 people. (Kansas City, MO, is ranked higher still, all the way up at 9^th place.)

So…could Trump invoke emergency authority to send troops into Kansas City, KS (and possibly KCMO, Overland Park, Olathe, etc.)? After all, KCK has seen two law enforcement officers killed just this past summer, and its police department has a sad legacy of corruption. Maybe the Unified Government of Wyandotte County has "lost control" as well?

My response to this speculation is: highly unlikely, but unfortunately not impossible.

President Trump likes declaring emergencies (ten so far in his first seven months in office; counting his first term in office, he’s issued 20 of the 90 presidentially declared emergencies since the process was codified over a century ago, more than one-fifth of the total). In his mind—and, sadly, in the minds of many of his supporters—these declarations allow him to take action without any supporting legislation from Congress. When he’s done this to federalize National Guard troops and use them for domestic enforcement purposes without any request from the state’s governor—as he did when ICE agents faced public opposition in Los Angeles—it likely violated the Posse Comitatus Act (and possibly the Declaration of Independence—which condemned King George III for imposing "Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures"—and the 10^th Amendment—which stipulates that powers not specifically mentioned in the Constitution are "reserved to the States"—as well).

Much of this doesn’t apply to Washington DC; it’s a federal district, not a city within a state, and consequently the president has complete control over its National Guard, though many constitutional questions remain. (It's also far from clear that the troops Trump has sent to Washington DC actually have anything to do insofar as the safety concerns he ranted about are concerned.) Still, it appears to be at least putatively settled law that were President Trump to do what he did in DC in KCK or more broadly, beginning with federalizing the Kansas National Guard, he would be on very shaky ground legally, assuming Governor Kelly hadn’t contacted him for help. (Though of course, how the Supreme Court will rule on this issue of presidential power, given the support for Trump’s expansive claims which the conservative majority on the court has already shown in multiple cases, is not something anyone who cares about the traditional interpretation of the separation of powers should count on.)

In any case, it’s fairly obvious that political calculations are often trumping (pun most definitely intended) legal considerations as the president and his inner circle make decisions. In this specific case, the cities that Trump has mentioned sending;specialized military units into are all Democratic-leaning ones in mostly Democratic states: Chicago, IL, New York, NY, Baltimore, MD, etc. Kansas, of course, is not a mostly Democratic state. But Wyandotte County is—having elected Sharice Davids, Kansas’s lone Democratic Congressperson, four times in a row—and Kansas City, MO, is even more so. And Trump has been pretty explicit about seeking to change the prevailing politics in the Kanas City area.

So could Trump’s desire to turn up the heat on urban areas that have protested, pushed back, and voted against his policies (as Kansas City definitely has), and thereby put pressure on their internal political dynamics and boundaries, extend to the KC metro region? Kelly, who has walked a moderate line throughout her time as governor, would surely rather avoid a fight with the president (unlike California Governor Gavin Newsom). But I’m also sure that, absent a truly unprecedented emergency, she’d deny him access to Kansas’s National Guard. How would the Republican supermajority in Topeka—led by representatives strongly supportive of President Trump’s policies—respond to that?

Let’s hope we never find out.

Not a Mea Culpa, But Like Unto It

When Trump won in 2016, I was genuinely flummoxed—disappointed and angry and frustrated as well, of course, but mostly just confused. It signaled the breakdown of practically every electoral pattern that I'd spent the previous 25 years schooling myself in. One of the results was that, while I'm not sure I ever fully believed all the screams about Trump as a Russian agent and all the other "resistance" stuff (what if Clinton called upon the Electoral College to reject Trump as unfit and just pick some other Republican as president? what if the deep state simply refused to acknowledge him as Commander-in-Chief and created a shadow government behind closed doors?), I gave it all far more credence and sympathetic attention than any subsequent, actually reasonable assessment of the situation showed it deserved.

This time, I'm not confused; I can see how it is both politically and electorally possible for a stupid, corrupt, wanna-be authoritarian to craft a message that works, relative to the other option on the table, for what will be, in the end, probably over 75 million Americans—almost certainly only a tiny fraction of whom are themselves inclined to fascism, and probably only a moderately larger fraction of whom rejected the other option on the table for what might be considered fascist-adjacent reasons. I didn't want to believe that, to randomly guess, some 60 million American voters would actually either disbelieve Trump's criminality and authoritarianism or consider it forgivable in light of various issues (like my mother's belief that Trump will keep America out of wars). But the evidence is there, and it's eminently believable.

For 20 years, since Bush's re-election in 2004, I've heard Democrats, liberals, leftists, progressives, Christian socialists, and whatever else the people on what is mostly my side of our endless political divides call themselves, look at Republican candidates and look at election results and say: "too bad for America; it was nice while it lasted." As much as I sympathized with the sentiment behind that phrase, and as much as was—and probably always will be—open to taking seriously the presumptions behind it, I really don't think I ever fully believed it. As Dr. Manhattan made very clear, nothing ever ends, so I don't believe it now either. But good grief, my fellow 66 million Americans who made the what I believe to be the right choice, if we don't (and I truly do include myself in that "we") see this as the conclusion of one more iteration of the story of the boy who called wolf, then where the hell are we?

Dear Mormon Voters of the American West (But Actually, Mainly Just Arizona): Let's Try This One More Time, Okay?

[Cross-posted to By Common Consent]

The presidential election campaign will come to an end 50 days from today. A lot could change in 50 days, but probably won’t. Ours is a deeply divided nation, as anyone who pays attention to politics already well knows, and that division is significantly the result of structural and sociological factors which there is no reason to believe anything less than divine interventions, at least in the short-term, could alter. Now, as a Mormon actually believes that occasionally there really are divine interventions into history, I do in fact hold out hope for some dramatic change in our calcified political culture. But assuming such is not likely, I, like all the other Latter-day Saints for Harris/Walz out there, have to look in the meantime for small ways that we--and today, I mean specifically my religious tribe--can make whatever meaningful differences we can over the next seven weeks or so.

Thankfully, there’s actual evidence in support of that hope. More than eight years ago, I speculated hopefully on the possibility that American Mormon voters, fully two-thirds of which consistently cast ballots for Republican candidates--and yes, that number has declined slightly in recent cycles, but it still remains mostly constant--might actually balk at the appalling Donald Trump carrying their party’s banner as a presidential candidate, and vote for a non-Republican in sufficient numbers to actually interfere his path to victory. None of that happened.

Instead the Mormon corridor, Idaho through Arizona, embraced the Orange Man, or at least contained a majority of voters who concluded that a narcissistic, vindictive, paranoid, borderline racist and sexist liar, adulterer, and con man was a better choice for the presidency than someone who wouldn’t appoint opponents of abortion rights to the Supreme Court, and directed their states’ Electoral College votes accordingly. (We can curse that stupid 18th-century leftover another time; I made my case against it over a decade ago, and haven't changed my mind since.) And the nation, including all us American Mormons, got the Trump administration as a reward. Which thankfully came to an end in 2020.

What changed in 2020? Again, as everyone who follows politics knows, the changes that mattered were overwhelming in Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The place that my people--or rather, the portion of my people who recognize that supporting Donald Trump for president is, as my blogging colleague Sam Brunson recently argued, basically antithetical to any proper understanding what it means, as a 21^st-century American, to be faithful to the gospel of Jesus Christ[1]--had in those changes was extremely minimal. But that’s not the case for Arizona, the fifth of the seven so-called “battleground states” which Biden was able to get win back from Trump nearly four years ago. There, Arizona Mormons mattered. And they need to again.

This isn’t anything new to the political junkies out there, or even just ordinary folks who pay attention to political news. The role which Latter-day Saint voters--and especially, when you really drill down on the demographics, white married middle- and upper-middle-class female Latter-day Saint voters--played in Biden’s 2020 electoral college victory, and could play in Harris potentially prevailing in the Grand Canyon State in 50 days, has attracted the attention of Newsweek, Daily Kos, Axios, Esquire, NPR, Politico, and more. The numbers, after all, don’t lie. It seems likely that about 6% of all the votes cast for a presidential candidate in 2020 in Arizona were cast by members of the Mormon church; that makes for about 200,000 votes, and Biden won that state by less than 11,000, whereas Trump had prevailed over Clinton in 2016 by over 60,000 votes. Did an ideological or political minority among Mormon voters more generally make up the majority of that 70,000+ vote switch in 2020? Did they make up a plurality of it? Did they merely contribute to that switch? Whichever way it was, it was a noticeable difference, one which the sensible minority of LDS voters across the state and elsewhere are rightly busy building upon as I write.

Of course, it would be nice to believe this could be replicated elsewhere in the Mormon corridor, but Utah and Idaho are, frankly, lost causes for at least another generation or more. (I suspect that the entrenchment of a long-standing local conservative LDS leadership culture in states with a much higher relative portions of self-identifying Mormons—42 % in Utah, 26% in Idaho—works against the likelihood of dissident LDS voters being able to leverage their ballots productively within their own groups, but I don’t have the data to judge.) That’s not to mitigate the praise owed to multiple organizations in both states that have been fighting the good fight. Mormon Women for Ethical Government, for example, a wonderful organization with chapters throughout the Mormon corridor and beyond, didn’t exist in 2016, but since that time has done important educational and empowering work among LDS voters and others (officially non-partisan work, to be sure, but given that they describe Donald Trump as “a U.S. president who used his position to generate anger, willfully deceive the public, divide our nation, and weaken our systems of government,” it’s really not hard to see where they stand).

But it is in Arizona, the land of life-long Republican and convinced Harris-supporter John Giles, the Mormon mayor of Mesa, where these kinds of grass-roots actions may genuinely make a difference. Not a huge one; as Giles himself admitted--to his frustration--to the Mormon Land podcast, most of his (and my) co-religionists are too committed to Fox News-enabled narratives about the immigrant or the transgender threat to actually take step back and consider how wrong-headed their continued allegiance to a party led by Donald Trump actually is. That’s why he hopes his party will suffer a resounding defeat come November, so the GOP can--or so he hopes, anyway--start to rebuild itself into something actually constructive. Again, barring some kind of divine event, that almost certainly won’t happen, unfortunately. But little victories matter, sometimes even matter in a big way.

Consider: what if Trump’s current 1% advantage over Harris in Arizona--which even the Trump campaigns knows is soft, resulting in a desperate scramble to activate every low-propensity MAGA Republican voter they can find--drops by half, or even disappears, over the next three or four weeks, with wise LDS voters knocking doors, making calls, placing signs, donating funds, politely signaling in church meetings, and overall just basically modeling for their fellow church members (again, perhaps mostly white, college-educated, middle- or upper-middle-class married female church members) that being a supporter of Vice President Harris and Governor Walz doesn’t turn you into anything disturbing, certainly not anything as disturbing as one of Trump’s ridiculous and pathetic rants last Tuesday? What if they consistently leaned into, in private conversations and social media posts, the LDS Church’s own profoundly (though of course never formally) anti-Trumpish statements and actions when it comes to immigration, posing it against Trump's insistence that suburban women desperately want to be protected from dangerous, low-income, non-English-speaking people moving in next door, and by so doing slowly turn at least a few more faithful, committed, believing, church-attending Mormons in Mesa and Chandler and Gilbert and Tempe and Tucson towards reason, thus evaporating much of Trump’s advantage across the state? That would force the Trump campaign, in the final month of the campaign, to make some hard choices, either of which would benefit the GOP's electoral defeat in the state: they could double-down on securing Arizona, pulling needed resources out of Pennsylvania or Georgia, or they could stick with their current plan, and potentially let Arizona trend away from them. Which, if you do the Electoral College math, would make it possible for Harris to still win even if she ends up capturing only three of the remaining six battleground states. (Well, actually four, because Harris will carry Nevada, as Clinton did in 2016 and Biden did in 2020; the LDS vote won’t make that much difference there, but between them and Hispanic voters and union members, it’ll be enough to win. Harry Reid’s reach, bless his soul, remains long.)

So anyway, Grand Canyon state Mormons, this is your moment: be the White Horse that never showed up in 2016, but which charged through Arizona in 2020, and needs to do so again. Do something vital for the health of our country, despite the majority of our tribe not agreeing with you. It’s important, darn it.

---

[1] While I’m in complete agreement with Sam, I personally wouldn’t put things that way, because I think not voting to make a fascist-adjacent crook president of the United States, while obviously the morally correct position, is also a terribly low measuring bar for determining what, politically speaking, it means to be faithful to the gospel of Jesus Christ. Religious fan of socialism and communalism that I am, I’m not even sure you can live, much less vote, as a 21^st-century American, with our daily lives awash with so much technological excess, economic selfishness, social exclusion, and environmental disregard, and still be faithful to the gospel of Jesus Christ. Thank goodness I believe God is going to save us all anyway, because damn, we all (myself most definitely included) will surely need it.