On (Not) Losing Our (Civil) Religion

On April 3, 1890, in Lehi, Utah, my maternal great-great-grandmother, Martha Mercer Kirkham, joined with other women to form a local chapter of the Woman Suffrage Association of Utah, an affiliate of the National Women’s Suffrage Association. Women in Utah had been granted the right to vote in local and territorial elections in 1870, but the Edmunds-Tucker Act, passed by Congress and signed by President Cleveland in 1877, disenfranchised Utah women as part of the national government’s effort to crush the Mormon defense of plural marriage. Kirkham wasn’t a plural wife, but she was a voter, and was deeply frustrated at this right being taken away from her. A humble 19th-century Utah woman, she stood and was recorded as saying:

Mrs. President, Ladies and Friends: 

In my weak way will try to address you a few moments. I believe we are in a good cause. We have our rights but have had one great right taken from us. I, for one, felt bad when my vote was taken away. I only had the privilege of voting a few times. If we live as we should do we would vote the same as our husbands, and he, being the head, should know how to lead, which I believe is his place, and woman to follow. I have always believed that if that good feeling that should be between man and wife existed they should be able to walk along together and be one in council with their family, and also in business; otherwise there is confusion. But the woman should not be looked upon as below the intelligence of man. She has the need of it and should try to keep herself posted with the spirit of the times for her benefit and also for the good of her family. How can she impart what she does not know herself? We have need of all we can learn, for how great is the mission of woman, and why should she not be able to have a voice to make law, to govern her sons and daughters? I, for one, would be pleased to have my vote again; it looks rather gloomy now, but no excellence without labor.

Kirkham never did get her vote back; she died at 37 years old in November that same year, and Utah women didn't get the opportunity to vote once again until Utah was admitted as a state in 1896. And of course, I strongly suspect that no one reading this (unless one of those readers are Secretary of Defense War Pete Hegseth and his sometimes-spiritual advisor, the anti-feminist and Mormon-suspicious Christian nationalist, Doug Wilson) would be fully comfortable embracing Kirkham's acceptance of patriarchy and headship when it comes to family roles. Still, her insistence that she was not "below the intelligence" of her husband--and, by implication, any other person--and thus should enjoy the same legal rights as he is, I think, the deepest, truest aspect of America's whole experiment with self-government, its whole civil religion, that one can imagine. The fact that hundreds of millions--and not just American citizens--have been inspired by this particular principle ought to be evidence enough of that, unless you're one of those reactionary or postliberal conservatives who thinks the very idea of popular sovereignty is an unfortunate canard.

I’ve associated America’s civil religion with the extension of basic democratic rights—most centrally the right to the vote, and thus the right to participate formally in the kind of collective self-governance which the United States, when understood in light of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, is founded upon—many, many, many times. I recognize the theoretical complications with doing so. What I’m doing is trying to connect what some would call “sentimental,” or “bland,” or even “anemic” liberal practices (and voting can certainly seem like all of the above, sometimes) with something tied up with deeply communitarian or cultural or even spiritual understandings of identity and belonging. Much of the scholarly writing on these topics tends to focus on “nationalism” or “patriotism,” and pose the question as to whether or not such feelings can ever be purely “civic,” or whether there needs to be (or inevitably, however unknowingly, must be) some kind of historical or ethnic or religious or linguistic or racial character to those senses of identity and belonging. Those in the latter camp (Vice President J.D. Vance quite obviously is, or at least wants to present himself as such) look upon the articulation of a civil religion or a sense of American identity that involves mostly just individuals exercising democratic freedoms and choices as nonsense.

My response to that—the response that makes me want to both keep those liberal freedoms and expand them and reclaim them when taken away, as my great-great-grandmother did—is to say that Vance, et al, have an exceptionally narrow understanding of how social ties and senses of belonging are formed in the first place. It is, I would argue, an unavoidable facet of human nature to want to understand the actions of individuals (including oneself) as embedded in some sort of collective, morally (and often religiously) substantive—that is, “truthful”—cultural order. This is the fundamentally dialogic character as human beings coming out: our ability to speak, think, associate, and judge impels us to retrieve from or construct through our social lives an arrangement of meaning. The result, as numerous religious historians have pointed out, is that the arguably “unsubstantive” civic actions that we take—like voting—themselves develop over time (through rituals and practices and terminology and traditions and more) into what might be called "voluntary national religious establishments." Not in the sense of an established church, but in the sense that there are forms of life and routines of expression that we come to rely upon, that we come to view as ordinary, or normal. And yes, as such norms develop and put down their roots, the question of defending them (as well as regularly critiquing them) becomes a part of the equation.

The paranoia some feel about how the changes which extending the notion of equality into ever more arenas and ever more aspects of life (from property and religion to race and gender, from voting and military service to marriage and participation in high school sports) may threaten those norms is not unreasonable. But what is unreasonable is the claim that the push and pull over our norms and social constructions, over the bonds and beliefs which constitute our civil and religious order(s), is itself somehow beside the point, and that really all that matters is some kind of sovereign declaration of identity. (Which necessitates a nation-state with a unified executive capable of issuing such declarations, perhaps.) Robert Putnam, the scholar who developed the idea of social capital, essentially concluded that the difficulties people like Vance highlight are short-term ones, ones that—in particular in immigrant societies like the U.S.—is always being negotiated by the emergence of “cross-cutting forms of social solidarity and more encompassing identities.” That is substantive stuff—that’s what makes for strong citizens, and thus strong families and strong neighborhoods. (As my great-great-grandmother Kirkham put it, “how great is the mission of woman, and why should she not be able to have a voice to make law, to govern her sons and daughters?”)

As a matter of theory and history, the complications in making these connections are many. Saying that America’s Jeffersonian creed, the affirmation that “all men are created equal,” and that therefore—especially once the U.S. Constitution was forced, following the Civil War, to bring the principles of the Declaration into its fundamental law—the affirmation that American citizens by right enjoy the ability to vote and act and build lives unconstrained by some natural hierarchy, itself constitutes our civil religion, our “voluntary establishment,” in an entirely substantive and not merely “civic” way, is to claim a lot. Some would argue that it claims too much, and that it would be much better to seek to articulate a liberal vision of equality and democratic participation and anti-hierarchy without messing around with claims which necessarily require a faith in an establishing “people” who are substantively articulating themselves in the first place. I find those arguments fascinating. But I’m enough of a liberal republican, a believer in both individual democratic rights and in the places and communities—the many diverse publica of the American nation—wherein we collective exercise them, to trust that, whatever else was wrong with the Founders original understanding of this American experiment, these principles, the principles that my great-great-grandmother humbly hoped to be able to exercise again before she died, are ones that this country can still run with, can still both defend and critique, can still build upon.

I don’t think America has lost its civil religion yet. I still believe in the power of ordinary people to organize (as those women in the Lehi chapter of the Woman Suffrage Association of Utah were), to express themselves (as Martha Mercer Kirkham stood up to do), and to vote, thus placing themselves, as citizens, on the same level as everyone and anyone else. Understanding the challenge posed by those who threaten that which binds these practices, these perspectives, this power, together with their own personal demagogic declarations, whether as performers of anti-democratic epic theory or just plain old-fashioned bread and circuses, is probably the first step to making sure we won’t. 

 

 

A Follow-Up on Christian Influence in Kansas (Democratic Edition)

[An expansion upon my latest Insight Kansas column, with the help of an image from The Active Age]

Two months ago, I wrote a column (which I later expanded upon) which addressed, among other things, on how Kansas Christians (which over two-thirds of the population of the Sunflower State identify as) have changed how they make use of their influence as citizens. Obviously the historical develop I was addressing had many causes—technological, socio-economic, and more—but still, it struck me just how many Christians, when they thought about the public-facing aspects of their faith, once regularly aimed to lift up Kansas society to the moral level they held to be scripturally mandated, whether in the form of prohibitions upon alcohol or Sunday closing laws or the abolition of slavery or women’s suffrage or so much more. Today, with a few notable exceptions—mostly pertaining to abortion, LGBTQ issues, and other matters involving personal sexual identity and behavior—the focus is more about providing financial support or legal protection to individuals, families, or businesses that affirm particular Christian standards, and less about presenting their moral message as relevant to social life itself.

One problem with that essay, though, was that as it moved from Kansas’s Carrie Nation past into the present, it came to focus entirely upon Kansas Christians organizing on behalf of and arguing for or against issues and policies that map almost solely onto the interests of the Republican party. In some ways, that’s predictable; for decades, the public language of Christianity (particularly Protestant Christianity, which for a variety of reasons has long been the dominant religious faction here in Kansas) has been owned by the Republican party. But nonetheless, there are still plenty of religious believers in Kansas—especially if you look at Black congregations, or other multi-ethnic Christian churches and groups who aren’t part of the powerful and mostly White evangelical subgroup—who approach the question of how to engage in public life with a focus on collective causes that are more typically associated with Democrats. Some attention needs to be paid to them as well, so this month, for reasons I explain below, I wanted to do so.

Over the past five years, multiple church-based organizations have sprouted up throughout Kansas, sometimes standing on their own and sometimes joining with others that have had a long history within their local communities. Together, these groups could be seen as Kansas instantiations of a national revival of the religious left (which there is evidence for, but which has also been falsely predicted much too often in the past), giving new voice to groups of believers who feel a need to, first, drill down on specific public policy problems, and second, pressure city and county officials to recognize the problems that have been identified and respond to the solutions which these groups recommend. In this, they’ve been making a real, unglamourous difference in many communities across the state.

Some of groups—all of which are multi-faith, but within which Protestant Christian congregations (Methodists in particular) invariably provide the largest number of supporters—include Topeka JUMP (Justice Unity and Ministry Project) in Shawnee County, MORE² (Metro Organization for Racial and Economic Equity) in KCK and KCMO, Churches United for Justice in Wyandotte County, the Good Faith Network in Johnson County, and the organization I know best, Justice Together in Sedgwick County. I’ve written on the latter organization multiple times before, and I’m proud to be a supporter of their work. But all of these organizations, representing tens of thousands of believers in the Bible’s messages about inclusion, charity, compassion, and justice, have pushed for the creation of municipal IDs (which help homeless individuals begin to rebuild their lives by applying for jobs and aid), for setting up affordable housing funds (which helps bring downward pressure on home costs in genera), for holding corrupt city officials accountable for their crimes (which helps increase trust in government and thus makes more legitimate collective efforts to aid those suffering from abuse and poverty), for creating additional services for those struggling with mental health or facing gun violence, and much more.

Have they been successful in all their work? Not remotely. For example Justice Together, after much internal discussion, elected to throw their weight behind an ill-conceived (but still, in my opinion, defensible) sales tax proposal in Wichita, entirely because of the funding it would have guaranteed to anti-homelessness and affordable housing programs, a decision that ended with egg on their (and my, and many others’) faces. But that hasn’t dissuaded them. Here in Wichita, at a recent town hall on the city’s 2027 budget, Justice Together brought out over 130 people to press their case for the importance of trying once again to secure through the ballot a stable, enduring source of funding for affordable housing and homelessness support, as well as other issues. As Justice Together co-president (and old friend of mine) Rabbi Andrew Pepperstone said at the start of the meeting: “We will not avoid this crisis; we will not stop; we will not be silent.” The turnout was so large the meeting had to be moved to the main city council chambers, and the power of their voice (and vote) was acknowledged throughout the evening.

To some, of course, the efforts of these organizations, and the numbers of faithful Christians supporting these progressive causes, is easily dismissed. In their mind, Christian engagement in politics remains the natural property of conservatives, and they point to how some progressives across Kansas have reacted with hostility to the entrance of Methodist minister Adam Hamilton into the race to be the Democratic challenger to Senator Roger Marshall as evidence for their presumptions. That hostility is mostly online and isn’t terribly loud, in my judgment, but it would be foolish to pretend that it isn’t real. In a low-turnout primary election, it might even be enough to sink Hamilton’s chances with the Democratic electorate (despite some of those same voters supporting churches engaged in the social justice work mentioned above).

At an event where Hamilton met with local voters in Wichita last night, I was impressed with how forthright he was regarding this particular challenge. For decades, Biblical language has been publicly owned (at least among White voters and those soliciting their support) by folks on the conservative side of the aisle; Democrats have spent decades articulating secular self-justifications, and sometimes some outright defiance, in response. Given all that, there is bound to be some members of the Democratic primary electorate who will insist that no minister, and certainly no person who—as is obviously appropriate when one works in a pastoral context, as Hamilton has for more than 30 years—approaches some of those same “matters involving personal sexual identity and behavior” with a recognition of and respect for the “tensions” which surround them (he shared a story about his own family history which, in another context, would have sounded like a set-up for an anti-abortion rights argument, except he turned it around into a case for supporting reproductive rights) will ever win their vote. How can someone like Hamilton reach them? Certainly not by downplaying his Christian approach to political questions; he knows that would be impossible, in the same way that organizations like Justice Together understand that eschewing Biblical arguments when they make their case simply undermines the whole point of their existence. The ways in which those inspired by the progressive or egalitarian aspects of the Christian message express themselves publicly have to reckon with pluralism in a way that wasn’t the case decades ago. That’s a complication, to be sure, but also one that aligns the character of the society we live in today—and that, perhaps, is an advantage, however small.

In any case, the history of Kansas shows us that Christian priorities were once as likely to be expressed by Democrats as by Republicans in this state. While that, obviously, has changed a lot over the years, it’s not like the language of faith as an important motivator for collective change ever entirely disappeared from the small liberal corners of Kansas. Expressing it today can’t be something done in same manner as decades past, but this election season, it’s heartening to see a variety of individuals and organizations looking for new ways to keep that expressive process going. I hope they succeed.

From Collective to Individual: Easter Thoughts on Constantine, Carrie Nation, and Changes in Christian Influence in Kansas (and Everywhere Else)

[A meandering and marginally holiday-appropriate extension upon my latest Insight Kansas column.]

Decades ago, the Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas—a man who has made his name articulating, in his voluminous writings, a radical, pacifist, vaguely-Anabaptist political theology, one which is suspicious of Christians understanding themselves as a force for justice or morality in the modern world, but instead sees Christianity as a call to form communities which reject and propose a complete alternative to our world of competitive economies and militarized states— wrote an essay in which he made an odd confession. In recounting he and his wife’s honeymoon in Ireland back in the late 1980s, he talks how they stopped to shop in a small village near Kerry named Sneem. It was a Thursday in mid-May, and to his surprise the shops all started to close around 11am. When he asked a shop owner what was going on, he was told that it was the Feast of the Ascension, and the traditional day for first communion in that part of Ireland. Leaving the closing shop, he watched as “little boys and girls appeared from everywhere fitted with white suits and white dresses,” marching to the local church for Mass, after which they would come out of the church, circle the fountain in the center of the village square, “while everyone in the town cheered and clapped.”

Unsurprisingly, given his theological views, Hauerwas acknowledges, in writing the essay years later, that he’s pretty suspicious of the Catholic doctrines he was seeing entwined with the social life of the town. But he also wrote “I could not suppress the thought: ‘If this is Constantinianism, I rather like it.’”

My personal take on Christianity is far more compatible with Hauerwas’s radical writings than it is the village of Sneem, at least as it existed in 1988. I didn’t grow up with any familiarity with the traditional calendar or liturgy of Christian history, and thus have no nostalgic connection to any of it; Mormonism was and remains, for all its internal structures, bureaucracies, and hierarchies, a decidedly low Christian church. Even though Melissa and I have informally brought many Christian traditions and holidays into our family life over the decades, and even though my own communitarian sensibilities have led me to be a lot more sympathetic to civil religion than most of my religious community, I still can’t say that I feel any sympathy whatsoever for Emperor Constantine, who wedded the Roman Empire and Christianity into one politico-theological whole, and thereby changed the movement began by Jesus forever. And yet, I can understand where Hauerwas was coming from nonetheless. Because here in Kansas, for all my liberal Christian (and liberal Mormon)—to say nothing of outright leftist bona fides, there is one vaguely Constantinian-ish figure I kind of like nonetheless.

Carrie Nation is a figure of folklore in Kansas, but a rather stunted one. Her work on behalf of the poor and prisoners, her marches in support of women’s rights, and much more from her remarkable life are not part of her cultural legacy, in the same way that the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, which supported so many vital progressive causes and social reforms, is mostly reduced in America’s national memory to one thing alone: the drive to prohibit liquor. In the case of Nation, that’s not entirely unreasonable; if someone engages in violent “hachetations,” destroying the property of saloon-owners and getting herself arrested on the regular, the fact that she’s doing it in part as a protest against predatory capitalism is likely to get a bit lost in the noise. Still, while I have no great desire to live in the strict Protestant Christian world that Nation imagined as normative, and haven’t ever been inclined to take a hatchet to those establishments and interests that I might be tempted to sign up in support of a new Prohibition against, I still respect where she was coming from. The prohibition against the sale of alcohol for consumption was the law in Kansas at the time (the Sunflower State actually held to Prohibition longer than any other state, only ending it in 1948, and Sunday liquor sales only became legal here in 2005), so wasn’t she really just expressing a legitimate small-d democratic frustration at business owners (and those who patronized those businesses) for rejecting a popular majority of Protestant Christians across the state had demanded through the ballot?

This is where this conversation becomes one that dives deep into the meaning of democracy, and specifically the power of democratic majorities in pluralistic environments. The fear of the tyranny of the majority is central to liberal democratic formulations, of which the American Constitution is at least nominally one such; it is for that reason, or at least partly for that reason, that contemporary liberals in America are quick to see any kind of moralistic majoritarian movement as, by definition, a threat to liberal rights. I don’t think they’re wrong to hold to that fear; the threat (and now the damage) which Trump has brought against our constitutional order has made me a lot more sensitive to the “bourgeois ends” that constitutional protections provide. But ultimately, I remain a participatory democrat (along with being a Christian socialist and left communitarian); I think that a false idolization of and an obsession with protecting individual sovereignty can, and does, get in the way of collective civil expressions that ought to be taken seriously when it comes to defining—and, perhaps, even improving—our shared common life. The fact that those collective expressions might be—as they were in Sneem, and as they were in the mind of Carrie Nation—rooted in broadly (if not universally) accepted religious principles doesn’t strike me as an obvious argument against them.

Which, at last, leads me around to some current news from Kansas.

Recently Senator Chris Blasi (my own state senator, elected—though not with my vote—from our district in west Wichita) proposed an amendment to an education bill in the Kansas state senate. The amendment would have changed the law to mandate that Kansas schools never schedule games or other activities on Sundays, or on five days around Christmas, or on the four days of Holy Week beginning with Maundy Thursday and continuing through Easter, or on the week around the 4th of July—or on Wednesdays. Since the Kansas State High School Activities Association, a private body that has been licensed by the state to coordinate policies across Kansas’s public school districts, already functionally does nearly all of the above, it is that last mandate which drew the most attention.

The ideas behind the proposal were grounded in serious arguments over the time demands piling up in the lives of students, and I take those ideas seriously. Long experience has taught me that I am hardly alone in being constantly frustrated by the expectations which both competition over students (and thus state and scholarship dollars) and our tragically internalized meritocratic obsessions have done to what are supposed to be curricular complements to in-class education: sports and debate and theater and music and the like. And yet, when looked at in terms of its practical implications, the facts were immediately obvious: the proposed amendment would primarily serve the interests of churches (again, primarily Protestant ones, even though one of the originators of the proposal was a Catholic priest) and parents that want their children and students attending religious activities on Wednesday nights.

I’m familiar with that want—one of my first teaching jobs was at Arkansas State University in Jonesboro, AR, and I quickly learned there that keeping Wednesday evenings free for Bible study (including cutting back on mid-week homework assignments) was a local imperative. Perhaps not coincidentally, Jonesboro was also a dry community; alcoholic beverages were illegal throughout the city (as of 2019, they started to allow alcohol to be served in restaurants, but retail sales are still banned). Such—dare we call it…”Constantinian”?—social structuring around broadly shared religious principles obviously isn’t unknown in Kansas, given all I said about Carrie Nation above. But times have changed—mostly for the better, I think, but changed nonetheless. Hence my sympathy for state Senator Caryn Tyson, who commented “It’s a sad day that we have to legislate this….Years ago, it wasn’t even an issue. It was a standard and acceptable. But here we are.”

The movement of American society—or even just Kansas—towards a mostly more secular, and definitely less collective, way of thinking about religious influence in the context of democratic representation is, of course, not absolute. For example, here in Kansas, the Republican party has used its super-majorities in the state legislature to push harsh anti-transgender legislation, which have impacts on as ordinary functions of daily life as access to public bathrooms, high school sports, or using drivers licenses as a form of identification. This can absolutely be understood as a moralistic crusade that attacks individual rights. But completely aside from what I see as the serious flaws (indeed, arguably the evils) in the religious reasoning behind the justifications for these attacks is the methodological orientation of the attacks themselves.

In some ways, it is evidence of the way in which most religious majorities in my state and across the country—at least those associated with the politically conservative Christianity that has shaped so much of Republican politics over the past half-century—understand their democratic responsibilities. After all, the overall aim of these laws isn’t so much about transforming society through shared, legally mandated practices, but rather a clearing away from society (or from their preferred vision of it) those individuals whose personal actions of identification or participation or sanitation they see as a violation. Again, focusing solely on the how this thinking approaches the structures of social life, t would be as if Carrie Nation hadn’t attacked saloons, but instead had stood respectfully outside their door, and contented herself with chasing down individual drinkers after they left. Not much collectivity there.

So perhaps, given its incompatibility with how American Christians think about their place in civil society today, it wasn’t surprising how quickly the legislature abandoned this Wednesday restriction proposal. But then came another proposal, one even more revealing.

Overriding a veto by Governor Kelly, Republican majorities in the Kansas legislature guaranteed income tax breaks to those who join “health care sharing ministries.” These are private health care cost-sharing pools, ones usually organized by churches and not legally obliged to cover the conditions which publicly supported and regulated insurers must (this was the main reason for Kelly’s veto). They often restrict participation on the basis of one’s religious behavior as well.

In our late capitalist, neoliberal world, the idea that people will try to carve out for themselves, their families, their neighbors, and—yes—their churches a space wherein they can create their own alternative forms of mutual support is something I can only celebrate. All praise for decentralized, interstitial action, says I! And yet, the idea that such inter-personal associations ought to receive state support lands in my mind basically the same way other Kansas, GOP-led legislation has, such as their successful push to guarantee that students attending private religious schools and home schools will have the exact same access to publicly funded school resources that public school-attending children across the state. The goal, upon reflection, isn’t about working through shared institutions to find compromises that improve them (by their own moral and religious lights, obviously) for everyone. Rather, it seems mostly aiming to enable those living in accordance with what they understand their faith to require to escape the costs and complications of doing so in the religiously diverse America (and Kansas) of today.

So in the end, put it this way: once, Christians—which include up to 70% of all Kansans—would regularly argue and vote in ways that took seriously the shaping and the improving of the daily routines of our shared social life. But now, it’s more typical to argue and vote so as to make certain that believers can be included in all the benefits of that social life, while still maintaining some separateness from it. Call it a shift from collective aspiration to individual protection, perhaps. This is a shift which is entirely predictable, given the atomization and privatization of so much of American life. Why shouldn’t we accept that our political disputes over matters relevant to the living of a Christian life need to be—and, given the pluralism of American life, ought to be—expressed in terms of individualistic choices, rather than anything collective?

So yes, it’s a reasonable change. But still, this Easter, I’m not sure Carrie Nation would be entirely pleased.

Rauch Among the Mormons

[Cross-posted to By Common Consent]

Jonathan Rauch’s Cross Purposes: Christianity's Broken Bargain with Democracy, the latest book by the longtime policy journalist and public thinker, argues three things:

--first, that throughout American history Christian churches have played an essential role in enabling our liberal democracy to properly function;

--second, that America’s Christian churches (mostly, though not exclusively, Protestant ones) have of late abandoned this role, and by so doing have contributed to the breakdown of liberal and democratic rules and norms in American life;

--and third, that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has continued to model exactly the sort of role which historically American Christian churches had once played, and that therefore, the more the rest of American Christianity can learn from and perhaps even emulate the Mormons–very specifically, the room which he believes LDS doctrines and practices make for a pluralistic civic theology–the healthier America’s democratic culture and institutions will be. 

Given the praise contained in that third point–and given the philosophically liberal presumptions which underlie it–it’s not surprising that Rauch and his book have received a positive, bordering on enthusiastic, reception among intellectually-inclined mainstream American Mormons, while a small philosophically (as opposed to merely politically) conservative minority have viewed Rauch’s arguments far more suspiciously. Who is right? Assessing that requires considering Rauch’s claims in somewhat more detail.

Rauch is well-known as an advocate of classical liberalism and political moderation; indeed, a large part of his reputation as a writer has been built on the fact that he is both an unapologetic atheist and a gay activist, yet neither reasons nor votes the way most Americans would stereotypically assume a gay atheist would. Throughout his career, Rauch has presented himself as a consummate pragmatist, always asking careful questions and eschewing any kind of controlling ideology. Of course, as with pragmatism generally, this kind of evidence-based, practical-minded worldview does tend to support a particular ideological position–namely, a classically liberal, utilitarian, and secular one, in the spirit of John Locke, Adam Smith, James Madison, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. Early in Cross Purposes, he describes his ideological preferences (though without calling them that) succinctly: “the modern tradition of freedom, toleration, minority rights, and the rule of law.” In support of such aims, he sees “three linked social systems” as essential: “liberal democracy to make political choices; market capitalism to make economic choices; and science and other forms of open critical exchange to make epistemic choices” (p. 12). He is and long has been a consistent defender of responsible, thoughtful, but nonetheless total individual choice, in matters of politics and economics and religion, unfettered by custom or community.

Still, he's no libertarian. He knows that there are things that he does not and perhaps cannot know, and thus needs reign in his drive for individual autonomy and trust at least to a certain degree in the slow, patient work of ideas and options through society and culture. It is that conservatism in his nature which has led him, a non-believer, to take seriously the historical role that Christianity has played in the development of the American democratic system that he prizes. In the book, he repents of his one-time intellectual over-reliance upon the separation of church and state when addressing social and political problems; he now views his youthful celebration of “apatheism”–the ideal of simply “not caring very much one way or another about religion”–as “superficial” (p. 5). Instead, he now believes “not just that secular liberalism and religious faith are instrumentally interdependent but that each is intrinsically reliant on the other to build a morally and epistemically complete and coherent account of the world” (p. 21).

In his view, since secularism and freedom of choice cannot fulfill the human need for belonging and meaning, and since the Christian religion cannot escape its inability to account for the physical laws and the moral horrors of the universe, what is necessary–and what he believes that “the United States has been generally good” at for most of its existence–is for both American Christianity and liberal democracy to do their part in holding up the walls of our civic home. Creating an environment wherein this balance can be maintained requires “that the Constitution be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the well-being of law-abiding faith communities, and that God’s work be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the well-being of democratic pluralism” (p. 33). The rule of liberalism in matters of politics and law must always accommodate religious exceptions, he affirms–but at the same time, the rule of Christian faith in society and culture must always give way to liberal protections and rights. This is a complicated balance, but it is one Rauch has confidence in, and one that he seeks to persuade his secular readers to be confident in as well.

Having laid his foundation, Rauch proceeds to build an argument that aligns with a good deal of other contemporary sociological research and political observation. First, that over the 20th century, mainline Protestant churches became less culturally distinct, losing their ability to mold their parishioners and implicitly direct them towards the virtuous role they had historically played in America’s civic order. And second, that Protestant churches which rejected the mainline’s compromise with secular liberalism gradually moved in an ever more partisan direction, adopting a paranoid and conspiratorial version of Christian teachings which Rauch refers to as “the Church of Fear.” This transformation led them to acquiesce to–and eventually triumphantly embrace–the vulgarity, immorality, and cruelty of Donald Trump’s paranoia and defensiveness as their perfect political avatar. And while I will not deny that my personal political judgments are a factor here, I would still insist that the passages where Rauch brings receipts, showing how thoroughly un-Christian it is to support Trump and the party he has built in his image, are really the best in the whole book. 

Rauch shows how evangelical (again, primarily Protestant) Christians have dismissed their previous insistence upon personal character in judging candidates, and in so doing ignored Trump’s criminality; how their gleeful identification with Trump as a cultural fighter has underscored how little faith they actually have in God’s providence; and how their embrace of what Rauch calls “sharp Christianity” has prevented them from articulating even a semblance of adherence to the Christian imperative to forgive and love, rather than fight and punish. It is, frankly, a damning indictment–and since he believes that those imperatives have been central to the develop of the civic culture within which American democracy developed, it is an indictment of Trump’s Christian supporters as un-American as well. All of which leads him to conclude:

[S]ecular liberalism and Christianity have separate purposes. They do not need to ally (and should not); but they do need to align, at least well enough so that democracy’s wheels don’t come off. . . . In that respect, we seculars are entitled to hold the church accountable to the democracy of which it is part. We are entitled to hold it accountable for the choices it makes. While the church’s relationship with God is its own business, secular Americans are justified in reminding our Christian friends that the Church of Fear is toxic for them and for us. We are not out of our lane to suggest that what Russell Moore calls 'confident Christianity'–one which 'constantly reminds us that this life is less important than the next [and] demonstrates something of what it means to forgive and serve one another'–needs repair for all our sakes. In short, we have standing to hope, perhaps even insist, that Christians get their act together (p. 89).

As I wrote at the beginning, Rauch believes American Mormonism provides a model of action that Christians could use a blueprint to repair themselves. But should we accept as accurate his overarching historical account of American civic pluralism? Should we accept as correct what he sees within the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as contributing to it? And if we do not accept one or both of these, does that mean the conservative critique of Rauch is correct? 

Let’s begin with what I assume to be the most obvious problem (at least for the likely readership of this essay; were I a Roman Catholic, Rauch’s Protestant-centric account of America’s civic culture would probably rankle even more). Any Mormon who is remotely familiar with our own history ought to be prompted to ask Rauch why his initial description of the American bargain between Christianity and democracy doesn't incorporate an explanation for the profoundly anti-pluralist attacks on Mormonism that defined its nineteenth-century development. After all, perhaps the single greatest argument that America’s liberal democracy was not, in fact, built within the liberal civic walls he describes was the official exclusion and persecution that violently drove the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints out of the United States entirely. And this is not a parochial point; placing nineteenth-century anti-Mormonism alongside slavery and Know-Nothingism as clear signs that America’s Protestant Christian civic culture was heavily dependent upon racial, ethnic, religious, and gender exclusion is broadly accepted as a key component of any historically honest consideration of America’s civic identity.

Yet the only discussion of this defining example of religious oppression in American history which is present in Cross Purposes isn’t to be found Rauch’s description of the intellectual components of America’s liberal democratic culture, as it should be; rather, it appears as one of the motivating reasons why Mormons–on Rauch’s reading–are so supportive of that democratic culture: “the modern church’s...memory of persecution has bred sensitivity to the importance of religious freedom and pluralism” (p. 108). Contrary examples from Mormon history–like Brigham Young’s politically illiberal State of Deseret or the economically illiberal United Order of Enoch–receive no mention in the book. Joseph Smith’s Council of Fifty does get a mention, but even that rhetorical embrace of religious authoritarianism–however quickly abandoned–is instead presented entirely in terms a defense of freedom and religious choice, emphasizing how “Smith went so far as to...propose constitutional revisions requiring ‘the armies of the government’ to enforce ‘principles of liberty’ for all people, not just the Protestant majority” (p. 110). That Rauch passes over the complications of Smith’s not-always-coherent embrace of both religious authoritarianism and republican freedom, to say nothing of other explorations of very real authoritarian alternatives present throughout American history is, perhaps, predictable, but still unfortunate.

My point here is not to claim that LDS church members (like myself), or Americans generally, necessarily must have some secret, ambiguous authoritarianism historically buried in our belief system. (Not that the rise of Trump hasn’t led some historians of American religion to suggest exactly that.) Rather, it is to claim that Rauch’s understanding of America’s liberal democracy and its relationship to expressions of religious faith, both as a matter of history and a matter of theory, is simplistic, and it requires papering over many ideas and actions that cannot be neatly arranged into a straightforward argument against the terrible choices which Christian churches that have embraced Donald Trump’s person and agenda have made, however worthwhile such an argument may be. 

Rauch makes a good deal of the LDS doctrine of agency, and connects that doctrine (one which, under Rauch’s reading, stipulates that, as all of God’s children have the ability to make choices, the process of choice–if not necessarily the end result–must be respected and tolerated and negotiated with) to several passages in sermons and speeches of President Dallin H. Oaks: “Oaks argues for an alignment between God’s moral constitution and Madison’s political one. Speaking for the church, he sees patience, negotiation, and compromise...as social and spiritual ends unto themselves” (p. 96). Rauch’s discussion of Oaks’s ideas is thoughtful, and his connection of them to larger LDS perspectives on matters dear to Rauch’s heart (he describes the surprise passage of the “Utah Compromise” in 2015, which provided protection against housing and employment discrimination to Utah’s LGBTQ population, as “inspirational”–p. 100) is obviously sincere. But it is difficult to square his praise of Utah Governor Spencer Cox for apologizing to LGBTQ Utahns for his past offenses in 2016, with his silence regarding Cox’s vocal support for Donald Trump and opposition to the interests of trans individuals in 2024, or his quotation of polls from 2016 and 2020, showing comparatively low levels of support for Trump among LDS Republicans, while failing to note more recent polls which show that support for Trump increased among all Mormon demographics in 2024. To be sure, these snapshots are part of a complicated story. But a complicated story about LDS history and culture–one where our appreciation of personal agency and public spiritedness is deeply entwined with our own particular, prophet-idolizing Church of Fear–is not what Rauch wanted to tell. 

In some ways the critique of Rauch made by conservative–or “post-liberal”–Mormons is thus correct here. Ralph Hancock’s pointed challenge--“how can religion ‘align’ itself with liberalism...without at some level in or some way ‘supporting’ Rauch’s liberal (that is, atheistic and ‘scientific’) understanding of truth and of humanity?”–is a hard one for those desirous to accept Rauch’s conflation of being a good Mormon and being a good (that is, non-Trumpist) modern American to deal with, and his fierce dismissal of Rauch’s key theological claim about Mormonism–“his understanding of ‘agency’ is neither a remotely adequate phenomenology of human choice nor a serious rendering of LDS belief”–is undeniably true. Unfortunately, Hancock’s conservative rebuke of Rauch’s longed (and simplistic) for rapprochement between liberal principles and Christian churches in America is also, in it’s own way, superficial. Rauch’s summation of the message of Christianity as “Don’t be afraid. Imitate Jesus. Forgive each other,” is obviously incomplete, and designed to point out an easy alignment between Jesus and his hero James Madison. But it is a substantive message, nonetheless, one grounded in a deep conviction of and commitment to Jesus’s loving, sacrificial gift of grace. To claim, as Hancock does, that the characteristics of Christianity which Rauch correctly condemns many Christian churches for having abandoned in their partisan, paranoid embrace of Donald Trump--namely humility, forgiveness, and tolerance--are somehow actually insufficient to allow for a “substantial participation as Christians in public life” is pure nonsense (or at least, nonsensical assuming one accepts such giants of liberal Christianity from Dorothy Day to William Sloane Coffin to Fred Rogers to Eugene England as Christians, which I assume Hancock would, though perhaps only with large, grudging asterisks beside their names).

To be fair to Hancock, none of those Christian leaders had to explicitly confront what he considers to the primary challenge to maintaining a substantive Christian anthropology today: namely, gay marriage and other assorted LGBTQ issues. Rauch himself frequently underscores how difficult these concerns–or indeed, his own marriage to his gay partner–are for certain Christian believers, which is again what brings him back to the LDS church, and how he believes its chastening failure in the fight against same-sex marriage made it re-dedicate itself to its supposed inner liberalism: “After its Proposition 8 debacle in 2008, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has foregrounded those elements of its faith which harmonize with America’s constitutional order” (p.120). Rauch believes, in short, that even Mormonism’s illiberal elements (which he does not theologically explore) point in the direction of a Christianity at peace with pluralism and negotiation. The LDS church changed regarding plural marriage and the priesthood ban on Blacks, after all, and yet it remains a substantive, in no sense “thin” church. So why shouldn’t the rest of Christianity follow its example, and make its way through a culture supportive of gay rights respectfully too? And it is this prospect which most horrifies conservative critics of Rauch’s vision of Mormonism–in Hancock’s words, the fear that “LDS church members have been insufficiently appreciative of the positive cultural and evangelical effects of the church’s alliance with Roman Catholics and others” in opposing gay marriage; the fear that the institutional church, in its drive to “participate in the fashioning of legislative compromises” over LGBTQ issues, will not fully attend to the “trade-offs of these compromises and their long-term effects”; and the fear that Mormons will take a little too seriously the idea of “peacemaking,” which comes “perilously close to endorsing not only the fundamental dignity of all God’s children, but even the ideological self-understanding of those with whom we find that we must compromise.” These are the sorts of terrors that will keep those who find the substance of their Christian faith mostly fully defined by few passages from Paul’s Letter to the Romans and a few pages from Spencer W. Kimball’s The Miracle of Forgiveness awake at night, that’s for certain.

Surprisingly to me, I find myself thinking that President Oaks’s words provide a better guide to the complexities of maintaining a binding Christian faith in the midst of a world of individual choice, as well as a better guide to the doctrinal imperatives behind such supposedly banal principles as showing respect to and non-violent acceptance of those whom one disagrees with, than do either Rauch or his critics. Rauch celebrates Oaks’s comments from the University of Virginia in 2021, “Going Forward with Religious Freedom and Non-Discrimination,” but that speech leaves aside explicit consideration of LGBTQ issues, mentioning them only in passing, preferring to avoid any explicit reference to doctrines or ideas, and instead endorsing the view of a colleague that practical, informal, non-rule-based trade-offs often work well in addressing questions about compromise where “abstract principles sometimes cannot.” Hancock describes Oaks’s General Conference sermon “Balancing Truth and Tolerance” as a “classic address,” highlighting its martial language “We are cast as combatants in the war between truth and error. There is no middle ground.” However, he seems to fail to fully appreciate the sermon’s very next sentence: “We must stand up for truth, even while we practice tolerance and respect for beliefs and ideas different from our own and for the people who hold them” (italics added). The post-liberal rejection of Rauch’s version of Mormonism appears to insist upon a supposed distinction between respect and tolerance, between people and the beliefs they hold--Hancock in fact goes so far as to state that it simply isn’t possible for religious believers to function honestly in an environment of democratic compromise while holding to a doctrinal understanding that their opponents are “profoundly and disastrously wrong.” Yet that admittedly hard, deeply Christian thing is pretty much exactly what Oaks is calling the Mormon faithful to do. 

Rauch is too much of a secular liberal, too committed to open inquiry, to automatically assume that any one view is “profoundly and disastrously wrong.” In contrast to the paranoia of the post-liberals, Rauch’s view of Christianity–even that Christianity which he believes has been horribly twisted into an advocacy for authoritarianism–is neither dismissive nor domineering; on the contrary, he holds up the minority position, what he calls the “exilic mindset,” as something profoundly honorable (p. 135). Like Oaks, Rauch understands the virtue of those see the world in accordance with a different truth than he. (In his General Conference address, Oaks insisted that, even when believing Mormons enjoy a majority position in a community, “they should always be sensitive to the views of the minority,” something that those members of the LDS church who have become convinced that they, and their conservative Christian allies, stand alone, defending Western Civilization, against the woke and LGBTQ hordes, perhaps ought to be reminded of.) So while Rauch’s articulation of that virtue is far from philosophically complete, he has nonetheless perceived something about kindness and respect, compromise and forgiveness, something that too many Christians in America have forgotten. If this gay atheist has found a way to use Mormonism–or at least one small, perhaps insufficiently developed part of it–to call those Christians (including some members of our own tribe) back to those principles, we owe him our thanks, and ought to listen to him as well.