[Cross-posted to Political Context]
About three weeks ago Conor Friedersdorf, a libertarianish blogger for The Atlantic, put up a post about how even those who support most of President Obama's policies, even those who see him as a much better choice for president than Mitt Romney, should refuse to vote for him. His reasons were pretty simple and straightforward: that Obama, through his toleration of (and participation in!) the expansion of extra-constitutional executive powers, through the murderous drone war which he has promoted over the skies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and through his willingness to fight terrorism through such explicit means as targeted assassination of targets (not excluding American citizens), ought to be beyond the pale for liberal and left-leaning voters. His actions, in short, are "dealbreakers."
Friedersdorf's post generated a storm of controversy. There were plenty of accusations that his version of the Obama administration's actions were tendentious and misleading, and that his construction of "dealbreakers" when deciding who or what is worthy of a vote was highly simplistic; he acknowledged the point of some of these criticisms, and hedged his position (slightly) in a couple of subsequent posts. But if his aim was to get presumed Obama supporters to argue about whether his (in some ways disappointing, in a few ways arguably appalling) record legitimated their voting for someone else or else not voting at all, he succeeded. One of my favorite political blogs, Lawyers, Guns, and Money (though guys, a quick note: if you were getting a new masthead, couldn't you have at least made use of a proper serial comma?), went ballistic, putting up post after post after post after post after post after post denouncing Friedersdorf's position, sometimes taking on other, perhaps less partisanly united leftish blogs like Crooked Timber along the way. It was a busy week, to say the least.
I'm not going to vote to re-elect President Obama. I hope he wins the election, because if he doesn't that will mean Mitt Romney will be president, and I like and agree with more of what Obama is likely to try to do in his second term than I do with what a President Romney would likely do with his first. But right now I just don't feel any personal inclination to support him with my vote, and I'm not troubled by that in the least. I laid out some of my reasons for this decision five months ago, and my thoughts haven't changed much since then. But because I promised David Watkins, one of the LGM bloggers, that I'd reply to at least some of their furious assault on the leftists-not-supporting-Obama camp, let me see if I can restate some of my thoughts differently. I'll start with David's central contention, in my (and many others') favorite post in the whole LGM blizzard, and see where that leads.
David wrote:
The moral purpose of democracy is not to keep my hands clean and feel good about myself, no matter how much politicians and other demagogues claim otherwise. The moral purpose of democracy is the reduction of abusive power in the world....If he is “beyond the pale” for the purposes of whatever endorsement you believe a vote implies, so to is pretty much all of American politics at the federal level. Identifying yourself as “better” than the American federal state in some important moral way is just fine; you probably are. So am I! I don’t kill people, either. But to move from that banal observation to abdicating the duty to use the primary tool we’ve got to constrain its abusive power is to badly miss democracy’s point.
His conclusion being, of course, that to present any singular (or cluster of) moral issue(s) as a dealbreaker which must necessitate voting outside of the politically relevant dynamics present in this presidential election--which for left-leaning voters presumably must mean either not voting for anyone for president, or voting for a third-party candidate, rather than Obama--misunderstands what democracy is about.
Two points in response. First, I disagree that the "moral purpose of democracy" can be contained within the narrow definition which David proposes. I see a number of diverse purposes to democracy, any number of which could be simultaneously described as "moral" depending on which conceptual plane (individual? civic? materialist? idealist?) one was operating upon. Personal expressive purposes have their moral content, as do collective identification purposes. To say that controlling the abusive power of the state is democracy's "primary" point is to cast politics into a utilitarian calculus (David betrays this move of his when he describes democracy as a "technology"). To employ that kind of calculus--probably slightly more people with health insurance! probably a slightly greater chance of preserving the social safety net! probably a slightly smaller likelihood of undeclared, murderous, and financially ruinous wars!--is obviously a completely defensible decision to make (I may ultimately be on Friedersdorf's "side" here, but I would never agree with him that it is somehow "immoral" to vote for Obama--but then, I don't think it's necessarily a sign of immorality to vote for Romney either), but it is nonetheless a prior decision about one's preferred moral calculus, and in no sense an obvious ethical imperative contained within the history of democracy.
Second, I would note that David makes it clear that he's talking about the presidential election; his point of reference is the "federal level," or in other words the national government. So, then, does he think that the "moral purpose" of democracy is different when you're voting for Congressional candidates, or for governors, or state legislative candidates--or, as I just suggested, local fluoridation? Perhaps he does; again, employing a legitimate utilitarian calculus, he might argue that there is a sliding scale present in how we balance concerns with abusive power versus other, less state-centered and more aesthetic, personal, or communitarian concerns. I'd in fact probably agree with his defense of such a scale; I'm much more comfortable with identitarian political decisions when I'm thinking about who I'd like on city council or what values I'd like my state to exhibit than I am with similar moves on the national level (as evidence, consider my confession that I'm a Mormon who has no interest in voting for the first member of my tribe to make it to such a prominent political level!). Nonetheless, should David admit to such a scale, then he's admitted that "democracy against domination" logic that he wants to invest the presidential election with is, at best, a contextual logic, one which operates not as a general rule, but in light of other variables, possibly objective (the office being voted upon, the level of government which that office inhabits), and possibly subjective (judgment calls about the relative benefits and harms which are presumed to be within the scope of the powers of the office or level of government in question).
All of this is relevant to a theme which (upon my reading anyway) recurs regularly throughout the above LGM posts and the long threads which followed them: the deep conviction that, in the struggle on behalf of liberal, progressive, and/or leftish causes, there are no battleground states, there are no caveats or qualifications particular to certain contexts or jurisdictions--there is only the general ideological battle, and you are either committed to it (meaning that you are, for better or worse, locked in by your own beliefs to the dominant political dynamics--the party structures, the available candidates, the campaign finance rules, etc.--which are available to this particular group of voters, which for the LGM bloggers obviously means President Obama and the Democratic party), or you're on the wrong side. There seems to me to be some deep Ralph Nader regret motivating this theme; at least a couple of the LGM bloggers, David included, cast votes for Nader in 2000, and have taken that lesson horribly to heart. Suffice to say, I've never felt that kind of guilt for my Nader votes. I knew what I knew then, believed what I believed then, and voted where I did then; if everything had been different, my votes in 1996 and 2000 probably would have been different, but it isn't, and so they aren't. To take the fact that the system allowed someone who I and many other leftists allowed--both intellectually and with our votes--to pursue policies that were stupid, immoral, and unwise for so long, and use it as an argument that somehow every vote and every democratic action, at all times and all places, needs to be weighted primarily against a particular kind of morally and ideologically constructed scheme of defense against state domination, is to completely ignore that obvious problem of aggregation, which Jacob Levy succinctly spelled out against David in a comment to his post. Very simply, you can't simultaneously affirm that every vote equals total responsibility for the ultimate results (that is, hold you nose and vote for the lesser evil, since one should imagine that every vote is the decisive, wherever you are and whatever the issue!) while also insisting that the only results which matter are those which are pertinent are those which involve what the two dominant candidates and parties end up doing or not doing (that is, forget about party or movement-building, or registering dissent, or anything else that won't in the short term have direct relevance to who wields power in which cause).
Both David and Scott Lemieux have responses to Jacob's point above, and while they both make some good points about the practical realities of nation-wide contests in today's America, with the general ineffectiveness of popular political signaling to larger parties and interest groups, they both seem to me to come down to a kind of in-group response: that their logic ultimately really only applies to "a group of like-minded about politics people," and that for voters with other sets of beliefs "the calculus is different." Scott is of the mind the democratic socialists are obviously included in his own left-liberal/progressive Democrati partisan group, but I'm not sure that's the case--again, depending on where you live, and what you're voting on. I can say, at the least, that it's not the case for a Kansas-dwelling populist/localist/Christian democrat/anarcho-socialist like myself.
So I will approach the election three weeks from today with every intention of supporting whatever Democrats I can locally and state-wide, since given the way Governor Brownback and his Koch-backed supporters have almost entirely cleansed the local Republican party of moderates, I have to support whatever practical resistance I can find. But nationally? Knowing that Romney has essentially a 100% chance of winning all six of Kansas's electoral college votes? In that case I look at Obama and the national Democratic party, and I see Bradley Manning still in jail, I see a president still dissembling when it comes to the horror of drone warfare, I see a refusal (in the face of mounting pressure) to rethink an invasive HHS mandate, I see no indication that there will be any grand social democratic economic push (just more neoliberal fine-tuning) in response to the continuing economic struggles of the poor and the lower middle class, and I don't see any interest in saying anything new about the war on drugs. Is that enough reason to not support the president? In a state where my vote won't help him do the many good things he might still be able to help make happen? When there is a candidate that represents, if not the correct response to all that I mention above, than at least a more correct response to most of them: namely Jill Stein, the Green Party candidate for president? I have to say, David, that I'm sorry, but you and your LGM colleagues just haven't changed my mind. (But please, keep fighting the good fight in Ohio--Obama needs your Democratic vote there far more than he needs my socialist vote here.)
I see a refusal (in the face of mounting pressure) to rethink an invasive HHS mandate,
ReplyDeleteSelling out women's reproductive freedom to Catholic Bishops now counts as a leftist position?
Selling out women's reproductive freedom to Catholic Bishops now counts as a leftist position?
ReplyDeleteI think that Russell is addressing Obama's departures from his [Russel's) own personal array of stances on issues, not from a specifically leftist position -- so that this would be the "Christian" part of the "populist/localist/Christian democrat/anarcho-socialist" mix. Which is mostly left, but not entirely so.
Stephen is correct, Malaclypse. I'm listing the various ways I, a weird combination of socialist, localist, and cultural conservative, have become frustrated with Obama. Incidentally, to the extent that the LGM bloggers only see themselves as trying to convince people who have only traditionally liberal-leftist complaints with Obama to stick with him anyway, then their arguments aren't wholly pointed at me. Yet to read weirdos like me out of their argument, in a perverse way, kind of sustains exactly Friedersdorf's point which they were at pains to argue against--that some principles (lining up on the HHS mandate, for example) need to be accepted as "dealbreakers.")
ReplyDeleteI've had a few arguments about this now already and have no clear idea of what I will do. I've figured out a few things, though.
ReplyDeleteIt's not my single vote that people are talking about, and not just because Oregon is safe.
I think that what they really want is a public avowal. They want me to go on record as being an Obama voter. They want ME. They want me to be one of them. They want me to be enthusiastic and to recruit others.
My single vote combined with my public influence amount to very little in the big consequentialist picture that they think is so important. I can't predict or control or measure the consequences of my vote, even after the fact when the votes are counted. They are as little as nothing at all.
On the other hand, coming out publicly as an Obama supporter, which is what they want, does has consequences for me, in terms of defining myself to others and deciding who I am.
So I am supposed the value the consequences that I can know and can control, the personal consequences and the consequences for my social self, at nothing. And the consequences that I can neither know or control, the public consequences which might be a nothing at all, are supposed to count as everything. And if I disagree, I'm a silly, selfish purist.
You know what's an invasive health/human services issue? My employer getting to decide if all my organs deserve health care or not. I've had good bosses and bad bosses, and none of them are ones I want to talk to about how my uterus feels.
ReplyDelete"On the other hand, coming out publicly as an Obama supporter, which is what they want, does has consequences for me, in terms of defining myself to others and deciding who I am."
ReplyDeleteWhat is really at stake in this election is John Emerson's personal brand!
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ReplyDeleteI would like to thank N. Eugene for instantiating the glib snotiness of that line of argument. As I said, the consequences of my personal vote or non-vote in the big picture are small, unknowable, and possible nil. Much the same is true of my silence or advocacy; I am not an opinion-leader.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, the consequences for my "personal brand" are real, knowable, and not inconsequential.
In order to make the argument for a big picture vote compelling, you have to value the "personal brand" consequences as virtually nothing. I presume that N. Eugene's snotty way of making his point is mostly just a consequence of the contempt his kind have for my kind, since we don't know one another, but behind it lies the Brechtian belief that only politics is real and that personal ethics, etc., are meaningless. That did not work out well for Brecht.
Beyond that, as I said, the reason nasty little people like N. Eugene are on my case is just because they want my personal brand to be in the Obama column; it's not really my single vote they're thinking about. I'm not the only one who's thinking about my public persona -- they want it too. That's what the argument is about.
I did compromise my personal brand in 2008 by assuring people that Obama would undo a lot of Bush's damage, but on the issues then in question (war policy, civil liberties) Obama actually defended the Bush legacy. So my personal brand actually won't be of much use to them anyway.
Russell, I read a political commentary way back in college that I think it relevant to this post - although it might sound tangential at first:
ReplyDelete"Philosophically, there is no difference between an extreme liberal and an extreme conservative. The extreme liberal just has more friends."
The point of the article was that both sides are saying, in essence, "I'm right; you're wrong. There is no middle ground." The only difference is the wording of the statement - one being more blunt and the other being more subtle.
The extreme conservative version is, "I'm right. Everyone else is wrong." The extreme liberal version is, "Everyone is right - unless they disagree with me about something I think it highly important." It's the exact same stance couched in different terms.
I voted for Pres. Obama four years ago. I live in a state where the votes of those who see things like I do might make a difference. I probably won't vote for Pres. Obama this time. I disliked a lot of things about Pres. Bush, but he wasn't a disappointment - since I knew what we were getting when he was elected. Pres. Obama has been a HUGE disappointment to me, and there are lots of things about his presidency I just can't support - especially when there are better candidates whom I can support, regardless of the final result.
I agree that my voice is just as important as my vote - and I want my voice to be on record supporting someone I actually want to support.
Two of the toughminded pragmatist commenters over at LGM combine hyper-rational yet implausible consequentialism with raving hysteria.
ReplyDeleteWhy I am not troubled . . . .
ReplyDeleteBecause women's freedoms don't count much with you?
Bcjones,
ReplyDeleteBecause women's freedoms don't count much with you?
If you understand the phrase "women's freedoms" to have nothing whatsoever to do with affirmative hiring of women, extending maternity leave, supporting pay equity, fighting job discrimination, campaigning against domestic violence, and pushing for a restructuring of the workplace to make it friendlier to working mothers--all of which I support--and instead believe that is solely about adhering rigorously to the sort of individualistic egalitarianism which insists that access to contraception ought to trump the privilege which America has usually granted to religious institutions to fully define themselves and their own operations, well then, yes, you're correct.
Could you elaborate on how a mandate that disallows religiously affiliated institutions from imposing their own doctrines on their employees and those employees' compensation package is not only inhibiting the freedom of religion, but is actually constitutes a dealbreaker? Would you consider allowing a religiously affiliated school or hospital whose parent church believed strongly in aceticism to ignore minimum wage laws? And, perhaps more to the point, why are the religious sensibilities of the employer more important than those of the employee, especially since the institutions in question aren't required by law to offer a benefits package in the first place? Telling employers that IF they want to offer health insurance to their employees, it must be comprehensive doesn't seem all that different to me from telling employers that they can't pay their workers in scrip.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately for you, Jill Stein is not on the ballot in Kansas), nor is she even an authorized write-in candidate.
ReplyDeleteI don't know where that leaves an idiosyncratic Christian socialist such as yourself, but I would submit that Obama/Biden are clearly the best amongst the ballot qualified candidates. As far as the write-ins go (and one might as well abstain as vote for a non-qualified write-in candidate) I guess Rocky Anderson is sort of a low rent Jill Stein, or you could strike a blow for localism and against the Electoral College (but in a federalist sort of way!) by voting Bush-Natvig.
Jon,
ReplyDeleteGood questions!
My response, part 1.
Could you elaborate on how a mandate that disallows religiously affiliated institutions from imposing their own doctrines on their employees and those employees' compensation package is not only inhibiting the freedom of religion, but is actually constitutes a dealbreaker?
Well, first, I didn't use the language of "dealbreaker" to describe my position; that was Friedersdrof's term, not mine. (And I explicitly reject his idea that, for leftists, certain elements of Obama's actions can only render a vote for immoral.) Second, if you do want to import his language into my argument, then you shouldn't treat the concern of mine about the HHS mandate in isolation; there's also Obama's record on civil liberties, on the war on drugs, on the economy, on the war, etc. Third, why is the HHS mandate a matter of concern for me anyway? Because I genuinely believe it is a good thing to protect the tax and regulatory privileges which have traditionally allowed churches and their sponsored organizations to define their own operations--including operations which civil society makes good use of, namely hospitals, schools, orphanages, etc.--fully in accordance with their own beliefs.
Please note: I'm well aware that much of this is symbolic politics, since many individual states already have mandates comparable to the HHS's in place. I am further aware that the way many of the opponents of the mandate have organized their resistance--through various court cases--involve them claiming way too much territory than I think they ought to be allowed to. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has taken in regards to the Obama administration's determination to maintain the mandate--all while searching for compromise language to get around the plain truth such a mandate involves religious employers, however distantly, in the provision of contraceptive materials which they decry doctrinally--to be a persuasive one.
Jon,
ReplyDeleteMy response, part 2.
Would you consider allowing a religiously affiliated school or hospital whose parent church believed strongly in asceticism to ignore minimum wage laws?
A good challenge. My answer would have to be, "I don't know." It might well depend on the doctrine of the church in question, and its larger theological justification for such, and the fit such doctrines and justifications have within our political culture, to say nothing of the scope of said church's place within our civil society. Am I therefore in essence saying that I'd let an illiberal church get away with being illiberal if they're socially important? I don't think so...but I won't deny that, as one who takes the idea of civil religion seriously, I do think one can and should balance different demands and expectations within a free society with an eye at least partly towards the civic contributions of the church in question.
More to the point, why are the religious sensibilities of the employer more important than those of the employee, especially since the institutions in question aren't required by law to offer a benefits package in the first place?
Another good question. I think I would respond by saying that I generally think it is quite important and valuable to allow religious employers to fully define their own operations, while also nonetheless being able to function as full-fledged participants in our socio-economic order (hence my admittance that what I'm talking about here constitutes a "privilege" given to religious institutions). Hence, if it is accepted as necessary for a large, socially beneficial institution like a hospital to provide fairly standard health insurance packages in order to be able to compete for resources and attract employees, I nonetheless think that the hospital in question, really just simply because it is a religious hospital, ought to be able to make use of the full range of benefits which come along with providing said insurance, while nonetheless providing it differently, in accordance with whatever particular determinations are to be arrived at contextually.
Dammit, Phil, it looks like you're right. That seriously disappoints me; the last I'd heard, the party had put forward an appeal to get Jill Stein on the ballot. All these words, and I may have to eat them all. Oh well, won't be the first time.
ReplyDeleteRussell,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your responses! Sorry about the initial misreading - given the context, I took the list of grievances to be a list of individual dealbreakers, rather than a more holistic complaint.
To follow up, would you say that, in general, when tensions arise between legitimate secular interests of the state and the rights of religiously affiliated institutions to completely define their own operations, you would grant deference to the institutions? Are there situations in which the state would be correct to impose such restrictions on a religiously affiliated institution, particularly situations in which the restrictions or regulations could be seen as necessary to the current socio-political order, and thus religious participation in it? (I'm just trying to make sure I have a fair grasp of your underlying argument here).
And secondly, while I absolutely agree that we must be excruciatingly careful to protect religious liberties from state intrusion, do you feel that it is within the purview of the state to protect the religious liberties of individuals from private infringements of that liberty, especially in situations like the workplace? Not necessarily just in the context of the contraceptives mandate, but more broadly?
Hence, if it is accepted as necessary for a large, socially beneficial institution like a hospital to provide fairly standard health insurance packages in order to be able to compete for resources and attract employees, I nonetheless think that the hospital in question, really just simply because it is a religious hospital, ought to be able to make use of the full range of benefits which come along with providing said insurance, while nonetheless providing it differently, in accordance with whatever particular determinations are to be arrived at contextually.
ReplyDeleteAlso, while I think that most of your points are well considered and are good for people (like me) who disagree, but rarely encounter well-articulated arguments for these positions to consider, the above passage rankles me somewhat. It seems to me to say that religiously-affiliated employers recognize that there are certain things that they would like to do (employ the best available workers) but that the things necessary to achieve them present a problem (they don't want to be in any way involved with the procurement of contraceptives). By offering health insurance with exemptions from covering birth control, even though there are acknowledged reasons to mandate them on public-health and individual good grounds, the employer is simply shifting the burden of their religious beliefs onto their employee who may not share those beliefs or agree with their interpretation. It may not be fair or just that there exists such a burden to religiously affiliated employers, but it strikes me as manifestly worse to allow that burden to be shoved off onto a much weaker third party.
Serial commas never appear before an ampersand replacing the word "and." This is used particularly in the names of American law firms, which frequently employ the ampersand; LG&M, being the joint contribution of a bunch of law-talking guys, almost certainly is following this convention.
ReplyDeleteJon,
ReplyDeleteI appreciate the continued discussion!
In general, when tensions arise between legitimate secular interests of the state and the rights of religiously affiliated institutions to completely define their own operations, you would grant deference to the institutions?
In general, yes, with a couple of major caveats. First, I think there are some basic individual rights that are foundational enough to our order, and some requirements of state action that are basic enough to the operation of our country, that my general disposition to favor religious institutions would be waved. This really isn't anything original; it's essentially the same point which the Supreme Court has made many times, with their language about the necessity of "compelling reasons" to infringe upon religious (or other) liberties. Also, 2) I don't think all religiously affiliated institutions have equal claim on this privilege. Again, I recognize that this means I'm playing favorites with which religions I grant a special place in our civil order and which I don't, but I really do believe that a serious and sympathetic reading of our history can provide context for recognizing the authenticity and importance of some religious contributions over others.
Are there situations in which the state would be correct to impose restrictions on a religiously affiliated institution, particularly situations in which the restrictions or regulations could be seen as necessary to the current socio-political order, and thus religious participation in it?
Yes, I could absolutely see such a possibility. For example, to expand upon one possibility that is no by no means unfamiliar to us here in Kansas, I think it is quite legitimate for the state to impose restrictions upon public preaching when it takes the form--as it does with the Westboro Baptist Church--of condemning "sinners" at military funerals. Our (I think) contorted determination to revere the 1st Amendment in all cases has left us mostly unable to explain why it is simply reasonable to call certain spaces (like graveyards) sufficiently sacred as to insist upon the state-sanctioned respect of them, even by other churches.
Do you feel that it is within the purview of the state to protect the religious liberties of individuals from private infringements of that liberty, especially in situations like the workplace?
I also agree that could be within the purview of the state, but of course the situations in which it might be appropriate are highly contextual. I don't want to come off as though I'm drawing a bright "always hands off the churches!" line here; I just happen to think that in this particular case, the theological cost to an important religious entity is great enough, and the converse burden small enough, as to not make the Obama administration's refusal of further compromise a discredit to him.
Jon,
ReplyDeleteBy offering health insurance with exemptions from covering birth control, even though there are acknowledged reasons to mandate them on public-health and individual good grounds, the employer is simply shifting the burden of their religious beliefs onto their employee who may not share those beliefs or agree with their interpretation. It may not be fair or just that there exists such a burden to religiously affiliated employers, but it strikes me as manifestly worse to allow that burden to be shoved off onto a much weaker third party.
I guess I don't calculate the costs exactly the same as you. I recognize that the employer is the more powerful party here, and that this involves (assuming that we are talking about a religious institution which nonetheless wants to operate in the broader American marketplace, which will almost inevitably mean attracting employees that may want to make use of contraception) allowing them to force their individual employees to accept the costs of what has been democratically decided upon as a public good. But by the same token, the government is a more powerful party than the churches, and one could just as easily argue that here a democratically determined state action is being off-loaded onto a weaker party: employers, including religiously affiliated ones. Now of course, one might protest that such is a moot alternative; we're stuck for the time being with a lousy health insurance arrangement which is mostly paid for through the workplace, so any other policy approach isn't available. But that doesn't change the fact that the costs cut both ways (and of course, those costs can be experienced differently, especially if one considers that on the side of religiously affiliated institutions there aren't just financial costs, but perhaps legal or even moral ones as well). In this case, I think the cost of the mandate for the churches isn't balanced out by the benefit enjoyed by their employees. (Of course, depending on the relevant state law, they may already have that guaranteed enjoyment, but I don't see why that should stop me from making what I think to be a correct argument out it this national controversy from the outside.)
Russell Arben Fox,
ReplyDeleteGuess I meant that someone who DOES care about all those things in your list--pay equity, affirmative action, et al.--is likely to feel "troubled" by people not voting for Obama this time out. It's about how important women are in one's calculation, it seems to me.
I like the cut of bcjones' jib.
ReplyDelete"fairly standard health insurance packages..., while nonetheless providing [said packages] differently"
ReplyDeleteAlong the lines of Malacylpse and bcjones' comments, it seems to me that it is a heck of a lot easier take a stance that health care for uteri is not part of a "fairly standard" health insurance package when none of one's own body parts is a uterus. What if Catholic hospitals arbitrarily decided that your appendix doesn't deserve to be covered? Or your liver? Or your kidneys?
It's curious to me that you *don't* see the mandate as related to the issue of pay equity, since without said mandate, religious organizations would be permitted to reduce the effective value of their compensation packages for women but not for men.
ReplyDeleteDid I miss something? You were tempted to vote for McCain in 2008 over the abortion issue. Have your views changed?
ReplyDeleteCynthia,
ReplyDeleteWhat if Catholic hospitals arbitrarily decided that your appendix doesn't deserve to be covered? Or your liver? Or your kidneys?
Then presumably I'd have to think about how they theologically justify that decision in light their publicly expressed mission, and whether or not I thought that constituted a decision central enough to their integrity as a religious body and compatible enough with the privileges traditionally given in religious institutions in American society so as to justify the burden which such would obviously place upon their employees. In other words, contextually, which is what I've always said throughout this discussion.
(As an aside, Cynthia, for what it's worth, you've tended to voice your incredulity about the fact that someone on the left could actually respect the point of Catholic church leaders and institution administrators in this case entirely in terms of some grand principle--that is, how can I possibly believe X, when surely, as a man, I would recognize that such a position is inconsistent with Y? But that approaches the whole debate on the wrong foot; in contains your argument within the bounds of liberal principles, and as I made pretty clear, my thinking about interventions into the self-policing of religious institutions isn't governed--at least not entirely--by liberal principles. So why not try a different approach? Why not attack Catholic doctrine? Why not argue that Catholic teachings are wrong and bad and sufficiently incompatible with the inequality demanded by free societies as to render irrelevant any religious liberty argument they might make on their behalf? A debate that gets into the contextual weeds is likely to be more satisfying to both of us than both of us getting annoyed about the obvious fact that neither of us seem to fully respect the principles of the other.)
Anonymous,
ReplyDeleteIt's curious to me that you *don't* see the mandate as related to the issue of pay equity, since without said mandate, religious organizations would be permitted to reduce the effective value of their compensation packages for women but not for men.
Hmm. That is actually a really good point. Generally speaking, as I've made clear, I'm pretty open to the idea that religious institutions ought to be able to involve themselves in the full range of benefits and structures of civil society, and yet be allowed to operate within that society on their own terms...but I'm not sure if I want to extend that protection to something as basic to the functioning of a free and equal civil society as income. I could see, and I guess I would probably support, religious institutions demanding the right to, for example, outright dock the pay of their workers for purposes of tithing or whatnot, because such would be an externalized factor in their ability to operate in marketplace in the first place (lots of religious colleges pay their instructors less than average, and it's just part how they position themselves). But in this case, we're arguably talking about an effective challenge to the comparable worth of medical packages, which isn't something that could be easily externalized equitably. Though maybe it could--like maybe not requiring Catholic institutions to in any way finance contraception, but to require them to pay women slightly more to offset that? Anyway, again, hmm. I'm going to have to think about this one for while. Thanks for pointing it out to me.
Did I miss something? You were tempted to vote for McCain in 2008 over the abortion issue. Have your views changed?
I think you're misreading me; I didn't say at the time that I was "tempted" to vote for McCain, I said I was "conflicted" about my choice to vote against him. Or in other words, aside from the abortion issue, I couldn't think of anything at the time troubled me at all over my vote for Obama. This year, I suppose what you're seeing is that my opposition to abortion rights have become somewhat less pronounced, so much so that I'm going to vote for probably the more purely pro-abortion rights candidate, out of a match-up between Obama and Stein. But if I wanted to talk about abortion this year (and I don't, particularly), I suppose I could say much the same things about Obama-Stein-Romney that I said about McCain-Obama four years ago. That is, if there is anything out that makes me think that perhaps I ought to support Romney, it's his position on abortion. But that's simply not nearly as important to me as many other things I mention. Does that mean I've changed my mind? Maybe, though it feels more like a small development than some major change.
Russell, criticizing Catholic theology would be a complete non-sequitur since in this case my quarrel is not with Catholic charities, or an argument that you give them too much respect. I think it is that you give [women's] health too little. In particular, I was trying to underline what I thought was a telling detail--characterizing a health plan that doesn't cover uteri and ovaries as a "fairly standard health insurance packages." I think many arguments about contraceptive coverage take place in a deeply latent mental framework in which women's health is seen as a one-off or a bonus. This of course makes it seem more expendable (when there is a tension to resolve, it's a go-to ballast to throw overboard). That it's sort of like orthodontic care. Most employers give you a "fairly standard health insurance package" but orthodontics is an extra flourish. I think this worldview is wrong, though certainly understandably held by many people given it is intimately related to deeply engrained and completely pervasive cultural, linguistic, etc, frameworks that cast men as the "default" or "genderless" whereas women are the one-off, they have "gender." (So you have plain ole "BIC pen" and then you have "women's BIC pen"--men get to be the default, women are the special case, the one-off, the default+pink). That's why I bring up the kidney. I don't think we'd call a plan that doesn't cover kidneys a "fairly standard" package. From my worldview, my embodied experience, I don't go about my day thinking of some of my innards (ovaries) as being special case and others of my innards as being "fairly standard" (kidneys). They are all on equal footing, they are all my innards, all twisted up into one great lump of viscera. As you can see, none of this has anything whatsoever to do with the Catholics and how much weight is on their side of the balance--it has to do with how much weight we're putting on the other side of the balance and how weighting the other side correctly would tip the scales even with heavy weight on the Catholic side. IMHO.
ReplyDelete"It's curious to me that you *don't* see the mandate as related to the issue of pay equity, since without said mandate, religious organizations would be permitted to reduce the effective value of their compensation packages for women but not for men."
ReplyDeleteI agree 110% with the spirit of this point that if men are going to be given health plans that cover all their organs, it is unacceptable in terms of pay discrimination to offer women a health plan that only covers some of her organs. But if you want to be letter of the law equal in terms of how much the compensation package is worth in dollars, we need to concede that women are more expensive to insure than men (at least I thought so--somebody correct me if that fact is wrong). I think the former is a more meaningful measure of compensation equality though. Sorry to keep harping on kidneys, but imagine if Catholic-affiliated employers said that they were not going to cover health care related to women's kidneys, but they would cover health care related to men's kidneys.
I just have to comment on the fact that the title of this blurb is just about the worst thing ever. Seriously, couldn't you spend like 10 extra seconds to at least reword that crap and make it marginally less terrible?
ReplyDeleteCynthia,
ReplyDelete(I'm appreciating this back-and-forth very much, by the way!)
I think it is that you give [women's] health too little. In particular, I was trying to underline what I thought was a telling detail--characterizing a health plan that doesn't cover uteri and ovaries as a "fairly standard health insurance packages." I think many arguments about contraceptive coverage take place in a deeply latent mental framework in which women's health is seen as a one-off or a bonus.
You're almost certainly correct that, at least in this particular case (in regards to standardizing the coverage of both women and men through all sorts of work situations, in the face of religious institutions that want to structure their workplaces in accordance with their teachings), I'm not giving women's health the same level of concern that you'd like me to. As we've discussed before, by granting certain privileges to the religious institutions that we have, I'm licensing a certain level of unequal treatment of women. The fact that I think that's tolerable when weighed against the preferences of those institutions themselves goes to the point I made above--that we have very distinct operating principles here in regards to the value of equal treatment vis-a-vis the value of privileging the internal ordering of religious bodies. And that's why I suggested that you attack the religious teachings themselves. You caught me out with the "fairly standard health insurance packages" stuff, and you were right to do so; if I'm going to own up to that stuff, than I need to admit that I'm not talking about anything "fairly standard," but rather something at least slightly contextual and selective. That said, my preferred principles remain. If there was a church whose teachings regarding the sacredness of the kidney meant that they wanted certain exceptions to the health care packages they offered, I actually do kind of think that we ought to at least ponder seriously the possibility of giving them that freedom. How far would I take this? I'm not sure; it would depend on the kind of arguments which the church in question brought on its behalf, and how I could see in mind justifying such arguments as having a place within our civil order. So, again, for me, I think the strongest arguments regarding this privilege per se (as opposed to the issue of comparable equity, in which case the relative value of earned health insurance packages does strike me as quite important) have to go to why and if I should accept what you consider to be sexist and harmful arguments as legitimate within America's civil religion. Far from being a non sequitur, I think an argument over whether Catholic (or any particular) religion's teachings ought not be taken into consideration when we argue about religious freedom and privilege, because of it illiberality, or something.
Cynthia,
ReplyDeleteI agree 110% with the spirit of this point that if men are going to be given health plans that cover all their organs, it is unacceptable in terms of pay discrimination to offer women a health plan that only covers some of her organs. But if you want to be letter of the law equal in terms of how much the compensation package is worth in dollars, we need to concede that women are more expensive to insure than men (at least I thought so--somebody correct me if that fact is wrong).
You're right, this is a strong argument, and I don't know how best to respond to it. There are, for me, two strong values here: respecting the right of religious institutions to be fully self-governing, without having to go Amish and remove themselves from civil society and the marketplace, and respecting women and equal participants in that society and marketplace as men. Unfortunately, for better or worse, many important religious bodies simply can't, for reasons of their doctrine, create practices that are dismissive of the distinguishing features of men's and women's respective biologies. (Hence the possibility that what needs to be attacked is the doctrines themselves.) You have a valid point that truly egalitarian treatment wouldn't create work-arounds like paying women more, but would instead simply mandate, as the HHS did, a single standard for health insurance packages, but we live (or at least I live) in a world of incommensurable value conflicts, and work arounds may be the best we can do.
Anonymous,
ReplyDeleteI just have to comment on the fact that the title of this blurb is just about the worst thing ever. Seriously, couldn't you spend like 10 extra seconds to at least reword that crap and make it marginally less terrible?
Better?
Well I for one am grateful for Anonymous showing up and making sure I don't earn the title of Most Annoying Commenter in this thread. Thanks for taking one for the team, Anonymous ;-)
ReplyDelete